Perspectives for the Spanish Revolution (1978)

PERSPECTIVES FOR THE SPANISH REVOLUTION

This article, written in September 1978, was published in the Militant International Review (Issue No.15), Autumn 1978

The death of Franco and the crisis of the ruling circle opened up a new epoch of revolutionary struggle in Spain. After almost four decades of the most barbarous repression, the  dictatorship had exhausted its potential, eroded by the ceaseless movements of the working class, which, in more than a decade of intense industrialisation, had transformed itself into a decisive majority  of the population. The giant armies of the industrial proletariat, concentrated strategically in the nerve centres of the country - Barcelona, Madrid, Bilbao - held in check the top-heavy apparatus of repression painstakingly erected by Franco at the close of the civil war.

With each mighty wave of strikes and demonstrations, the ability of the ruling class to contain the revolutionary movement with the methods of the bullet and the bludgeon were called more openly into question. Every new martyr in this bloody war of attrition served only to arouse an undying spirit of hatred in the breast of the Spanish people, and isolate the regime still further.

The unbearable accumulated tensions of four decades of dictatorship gave rise to the heat-lightening of individual terror. Hated officials, torturers, policemen and civil guard fell victims to the bullets of the Basque ETA and the Maoist FRAP. The Franco regime, in its death-agonies, seized the advantage which these acts of individual violence offered, to arrest, punish and execute. But to no avail. No amount of executions could stave off the collapse of the worm-eaten dictatorship, the social base of which had been completely undermined for more than a decade.

The movement of the working class communicated itself rapidly to the myriad intermediate layers of society, now completely disaffected from the regime: students, actors, lawyers, professors, small farmers, junior army officers, doctors, priests, small shopkeepers - demonstrated in large numbers their growing opposition to the dictatorship and solidarity with the democratic demands of the workers.

In the outlying lands of the Basques and Catalans, the national consciousness of the peoples deprived of their rights and denied a national identity for more than a generation of fascist slavery began to stir powerfully. The widespread sympathy or at least tolerance enjoyed" by the ETA can be understood only in terms of the decades of brutal police oppression, the total destruction of Basque and Catalan autonomy and the national-cultural discrimination practiced against the minority nationalities of Spain by the centralist 'Castillian' ruling class in Madrid. Basque and Catalan children were denied the right to education in their own languages. The Basque or Catalan who lapsed into their native language was told to "speak Christian" (ie Spanish).

Worse still, the armed police and Civil Guard drawn from other provinces and quartered on the Basques and Catalans behaved, and still behave, like an army of occupation in a conquered country. Under such conditions, the disintegration of the dictatorship was bound to lead, and did lead, to the re-emergence of powerful centrifugal tendencies, with the upsurge of strong nationalist and autonomist movements, not only in the Basque country and Catalonia, but also in Galicia, Valencia, Andalucia, and the Canary Islands. In a country where the historical task of national unification was never properly carried out, and with a long history of nationalist and regionalist uprisings, the national question emerges as one of the most burning problems facing the working class and one of the key weaknesses of the bourgeois state in Spain at the present time.  

In particular, as the recent events in Pamplona and Renteria clearly show, the Basque problem is like a time-bomb which threatens at any moment to explode and engulf the whole Peninsula in the flames of nationalist and terrorist strife. Along with the catastrophic economic situation, the national question, particularly in the Basque country, constitutes the most dangerous threat to the stability of Spanish capitalism. 

Economic

Catastrophe

Faced with the rising tide of working class unrest, strikes and demonstrations, ferment and opposition among the middle classes, the festering national problem in Catalonia and the Basque country and the upsurge of terrorist violence, the Spanish bourgeoisie was rent with internal dissent. Important sections of the capitalist class, feeling the ground tremble beneath their feet, were cautiously advocating reforms to prevent a revolutionary explosion.

But decades of corrupt dictatorship had spawned a fat layer of venal officials and fascist bureaucrats with comfortable positions in the apparatus of the state, police, army and vertical sindicato "trade union." The opposition of these creatures, linked to the most reactionary and obtuse sections of finance capital, stubbornly blocked the path of would-be "reformers" such as Areilza, foreign minister of the first government of the Juan Carlos monarchy, under the aegis of arch-reactionary Arias Navaro after the death of Franco.

Hardly had the ministers had time to install themselves in their new offices when the country was gripped by a wave of industrial struggles the like of which had not been seen since the 1930s. The storm-centre was Madrid itself where, as a consequence of industrial development over the past decade, the working class has accumulated a strength almost on a par with the traditional centre of the Spanish workers' movement, Barcelona. Wave after wave of strikes engulfed the entire province. 

Mass revolt

The strike fever swiftly communicated itself to the rest of the country, and for a period of months, the Arias government found itself caught up in a maelstrom of social unrest in which the workers' economic demands became the focal point for a whole series of political demands: amnesty, the readmission of all sacked workers, the disbanding of the repressive organs set up by the dictatorship and punishment for those responsible for atrocities and crimes against the people, legalisation of all trade unions and political parties, free elections, autonomy and the right of self-determination for the oppressed nationalities.

The Arias government, vacillating and divided against itself, floundered impotently in this sea of popular discontent. Whatever line of action it took was doomed in advance. Its concessions and reforms satisfied no-one, while its repressive acts irritated and repelled everyone. The long list of unfulfilled hopes and broken promises, the intolerable delays and prevarications merely stoked the fires of impatience and discontent which erupted with particular violence in the Vitoria general strike in March 1976. This elemental explosion of the working people of Alava served notice on the ruling class of what might happen if the course of reform was not speeded up.

The events of Alava showed the enormous revolutionary potential in the Spanish working class, unbroken after decades of repression and totalitarian rule. With no lead from any of the political parties and underground trade unions, the workers carried out an impressive general strike, organised by means of workers' councils at all levels and generalised to include the representatives of the housewives', tenants associations, small shopkeepers and students. On the 3rd of March, the streets of Vitoria were turned into a battle-ground between the armed riot police and the striking workers who erected barricades and met the police with showers of stones and bricks.

For practically the whole day the city was in the hands of the workers with the police battling to re-gain control which they finally did after the cold-blooded massacre of unarmed workers at the Church of St. Francis. Undoubtedly, had the magnificent movement of the Vitoria workers been seconded by a general strike throughout Spain, the government would have been unable to concentrate its forces in Vitoria and events would have taken a very different course.

But the leaders of the still illegal workers' parties in Spain made no attempt to generalise this, or any of the numerous strikes that swept over Spain for months on end. One of the principal spokesmen of the CP dominated trade union, the Workers' Commissions, Nicholas Sartorius publicly characterised the Vitoria movement as "an immature form of struggle." We might add that the CP's "mature" tactics at this time consisted, among other things, of advising striking workers to applaud the police when they turned up - which certainly did not lead to a reduction of police violence against strikers!

The leaders of the main workers' organisations, and in particular the "Communist" party which, at that particular moment in time, had under its control decisive sections of the organised working class, appeared to be almost as frightened by the movement of the masses as the ruling class. 

Throughout this stormy period they bent with might and main to exercise a "moderating" influence on the struggle, calling out different sections at differenct times, refusing to generalise the strike movement, limiting its duration and extent as far as possible.

The reason for this behaviour is not far to seek. The whole strategy of the CP leaders for sometime was based on the ideas of an alliance with the so called "progressive" wing of the capitalists for the "restoration of democracy". As a first step, the CP leaders had formed the "democratic Junta" with the representatives of obscure bourgeois grouplets composed of ex-fascists turned "liberals". For their part, the leaders of the Socialist Party (PSOE) first refused to participate in the Junta, then formed a parallel organisation of a similar type, the "Democratic Platform", then finally agreed to merge both organisations in the so-called "Democratic Convergence" .

C.P. leaders

Nobody could have had the slightest doubt that the only part of this organisation which had any real power were the workers' parties. The fictitious character of the bourgeois "allies" of the CP and PSOE clearly exposed in the subsequent elections, was evident from the very beginning. Among other unsavoury characters involved was Gil-Robles, the founder of Spanish clerical-fascism in the 1930s and Trevijano, an individual representing no-one but himself who was later publicy exposed for his part in a financial and political scandal in former Spanish Guinea.

Yet the leaders of the workers' parties, especially the CP, were
adamant on the need for such elements to be present in the "broad alliance" and even agreed to give them what amounted to the right to veto within the unified body. 

Santiago Carillo

By means of such policies, the leaders of the Spanish working class gave the ruling class a breathing-space and an opportunity beyond their wildest imaginings. From a situation which had appeared almost hopeless only a few months before the bankers, industrialists and capitalist politicians gradually understood, that the regime still remained, albeit tenuously, in their hands.

The situation had been saved by the "responsible", "moderate", and "statesmanlike", conduct of the workers' leaders, whose primary aim throughout this entire period consisted in attempting to prove to the ruling class that they and their parties constituted no threat to the established order of society.

The strategists of capital could scarcely believe their good fortune. Was it not all too good to be true? Could they trust the word of Felipe Gonzalez and, above all, of Santiago Carillo, the leader of the "Communist" party? For his part Carillo leaned over backwards to prove his "his good faith".

The behaviour of the leadership of the PCE and the lengths to which they carried their policy of open class collaboration has no parallel in the whole history of the international labour movement. For many years the cornerstone of the party's policy had been that of "national reconciliation". The CP's main demand was now a government of "national concentration" - including all the political parties, even those of the fascist right wing with, of course, the participation of the CP leaders.

Throughout the colossal wave of strikes which shook the fabric of Spanish bourgeois society in the months following Franco's death, the CP leadership used its considerable industrial weight to brake and fragment the movement, avoiding at all costs the generalisation of the strike wave. Shortly after Carillo's return to Spain,the Party moved still further to the right with the open acceptance of the Monarchy and the Suarez government.which had meantime replaced the ill-starred Arias Navaro ministry. In a move which caused a shock-wave throughout the grass roots of the Party, Carillo announced, that henceforth, the gold and red flag of the Spanish Monarchy would be flown at all Party meetings and public demonstrations.

The Republic was dropped unceremoniously from the Party's
agitation and youngsters carrying the Republican tricolour forcibly ejected from Party meetings and beaten up by CP stewards. Forgetting his earlier criticism of Juan Carlos as a stooge of Franco, Carillo has made repeated reference to the King as the "main motor force of the democratising process in Spain". He has gone out of his way to praise the ex-general secretary of the Fascist Movimiento, Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez. In one newspaper interview, Carillo stated
that his only criticism of Suarez was that he was not a member of the Communist Party!

Reaction weak

In all this we see the fundamental difference between the revolutionary process in Spain and the Russian revolution in Spain, the revolutionary preparation of the working class, and especially of the most active and conscious layer, the vanguard, had taken place in the enormous wave of strikes and class battles for more than ten years before the death of Franco. In their scope and intensity the class struggles in Spain were even greater than the revolutionary movement in Russia in the period 1910-14.

The strike wave which burst out in the first months after the death of the dictator,which aroused the active support and sympathy of the whole of Spanish society, completely isolating the forces of reaction and throwing the ruling class into a state of panic and hysteria, had every possibility of extending into a strike with the formation of soviets, or workers' councils as the experience of Vitoria clearly demonstrated.

Faced with the implacable movement of the people, the apparatus of repression would have broken in the hands of those who attempted to use it. The thinking representatives of big business had no illusions on this score. Yet the situation in Spain, in those months of turmoil, did not lead to a new edition of the February Revolution in Russia, or even to a revolutionary overturn such as took place in Portugal after the 25th April. What is the explanation of this?

The difference does not lie in the objective situation. In every respect, the situation in Spain was far more mature for revolution than, say Portugal at the time of the Armed Forces' coup d'etat. And it is here we see the decisive role of the subjective factor in the revolution. Many times in the history of the last seventy years we have witnessed similar revolutionary situations where power was within reach of the working class and yet the revolutionary movement was aborted for the lack of a real Marxist party and leadership. Spain was no exception to this rule. And the difference with Russia consisted precisely in this.

In Russia, for a period of decades prior to 1917, a whole generation of workers had had the experience, not only of great class battles, but also of the Marxist leadership of the Bolshevik party of Lenin. For many years the active layer of the class, those tens of thousands of conscious proletarians, the best class fighters in every workshop, mine and mill, the people we may call the natural leaders of the working class had been imbued by the Bolshevik policy, its press and agitators; with one single, overriding and imperative idea: do not place your trust In the Liberal capitalist politicians, do not compromise your class Independence in blocs and alliances with the so-called "progressive" bourgeoisie: trust only in yourselves and flght only under your own banner in defence of your own programme and policy. 

Although the so-called "Communist" leaders of today have forgotten it, to their eternal shame, this Marxist idea was what fundamentally separated Bolshevism from Menshevism: in other words, revolutionary socialism from reformist class collaborationism. 

But not even the Russian mensheviks, with their policy of collaboration with the liberal bourgeoisie, ever went so far as Carillo and the other leaders of the Spanish CP in their abject policy of capitulation to the Suarez government and the Juan Carlist Monarchy.

The CP leaders blindly placed their trust in the "reformist" wing of the Spanish capitalist class. As if the "reforms" and concessions had been graciously conceded by Suarez out of the goodness of his heart, or as a result of the "skilful" wheeling and dealing of the Carillo, and not out of abject fear of the movement of the working class! The CP leaders, in their reformist blindness, could not understand that the tactical retreat of the Spanish ruling class had been forced upon them by the changed balance of forces. 

 Pre-Marxist

In place of the Marxist class analysis of society, the lamentable "theoreticians" of the PCE have erected an amazingly elaborate metaphysical construction whereby the whims and caprices of the individual bourgeois politicians and, of course, the "cleverness" of Carillo determine the fate of society A wrong word here, "undiplomatic" gesture there, immediately cause the tanks to roll into the streets of Madrid, according to the "wise men" of thePCE Central Committee.
Instead of understanding the class dynamics which open up the rifts in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, causing one sector to advocate reform and another repression, Carillo and Co. retreat into the Alice in Wonderland world of "good" capitalists and "bad" capitalists. Clutching the "good" capitalist Suarez by the sleeve, Carillo fondly imagines that he is helping "progress" against "reaction".

Thus the leaders of the "Communist" party of Spain have abandoned the Marxist class view of society in favour of the pre-Marxist liberal democratic idea of "progress" versus "reaction" . The forces of the proletariat become hopelessly entangled and merged with the general morass of "democratic and progressive forces", which in the case of Spain includes a veritable rogues' gallery of "converted" fascists and yesterday's hangmen of the working class up to and including His Majesty Juan Carlos de Borbon y Borbon and the ex-general secretary of Franco's Movimento whose main fault is that he is (for inexplicable reasons) "not a member of the PCE"! And this is the travesty of Marxism which, day in and day out, has been fed to the rank and file CP workers by their leaders, through the Party press, in meetings, cells and study circles. A whole generation of the most advanced layers of the Spanish proleteriat have been educated by the "theoreticians" of the CP, not in the Leninist spirit of implacable hostility towards the bourgeoisie, but in that of collaboration with, and subordination to, the so-called "progressive"wing of the ruling class.

This behaviour of the CP leaders came as a complete surprise to the bourgeoisie who, after 40 years of the most brutal repression directed primarily against the Communist workers, expected the worst from that quarter. Now,very rapidly the more intelligent wing of the ruling class, represented by the arch-opportunist Suarez, came to understand the real significance of the policy of Carillo and its importance for the successful execution of the enormously dangerous and difficult transition from the methods of open dictatorship to a more subtle form of class rule.

Contrary to the myth of the "good" capitalists and the "bad" capitalists assiduously disseminated by the CP leaders, the fact remains that the bourgeoisie does not rule on the basis of ideas and principles. The capitalist class is always very flexible as regards the methods which it uses to dominate society. Its preference for dictatorship or democracy is not determined by the subjective wishes of this or that bourgeois politician, and certainly not by the mincing and fawning of the moderate "statesmen" of the CP, but purely and simply by the prevailing class balance of forces.

For some time before the death of the Caudillo, the more thinking representatives of capital had understood that, with the changed relationship of class forces in Spanish society, the continuation of the old methods of repression was increasingly counter-productive and actually constituted a threat to the survival of the rule of their class. The intolerable pressures and contradictions that were accumulating within society, lacking the safety valve provided by the legal outlets of "normal" bourgeois parliamentary democracy, could at any time erupt and bring down the entire edifice of capitalism in Spain.

Only a profound and craven fear of the movement of the masses was capable of producing the "miraculous" transformation of Suarez, Areilza and Juan Carlos from life-long fascists and supporters of Franco into latter-day democrats and "friends of the people". Only the heroic movement of the working class, stiffening the opposition of the intellectuals, clergy and middle layers of society, deprived the regime of its mass base, suspended the dictatorship in mid-air, and reduced the mighty repressive apparatus to a state of impotence.  

Yet for Carillo and the other CP leaders the whole secret of the "transition to democracy" lay, and still lies, in their ability to ingratiate themselves with the bourgeoisie and demonstrate in deeds as well as in words that the threat of a revolutionary overturn is a mere figment of the imagination and that the working class, under their responsible guidance and leadership, will never transgress the boundaries of bourgeois legality, or to use one of Carillo's favourite expressions, will never break "the rules of the game".  

Suarez referendum

 If Cervantes, the greatest of Spanish humanists, were living today he would have no problem in composing a parody still more hilarious than Don Quixote describing the farcical activities of the Spanish labour leaders, tilting at the windmills of the ever-present "forces of reaction" and falling over themselves in their efforts to win the favours of Suarez and the King who privately reward their labours with the same rude guffaws bestowed on the mad knight by the peasant girls he mistook for beautiful maidens in distress. And just like Don Quixote, the leaders of the Spanish working class always end up with the soundest of buffetings as a reward for their efforts.

As always happens, the "parochial", "realistic" politicians of labour always turn out to be the most hopeless of utopians when it comes to the test. The results of their actions turn out to be diametrically opposed to their intentions. So it was with the ignominious "Democratic Co-ordination", which first tried to negotiate with Suarez the contents of his promised reforms, then couldn't make up its mind whether to say "yes" or "no" to the Referendum, and by the time it decided to abstain, Suarez had already succeeded in convincing the country that his package deal had indeed been freely negotiated with the (still illegal) opposition and (in the lack of any alternative whatsoever on the part of the Democratic Co-ordination) got an overwhelming "Yes" vote in the Referendum.

Only in the Basque provinces was there a sizeable abstention. In the rest of the country, the workers, peasants and small shopkeepers took one look at the sorry disarray of the "democratic" opposition, which for months on end had been telling them what good and sincere democrats Suarez and Juan Carlos were, and decided to vote "yes" - and see what happened.

The pathetic campaign organised at the very last moment in favour of abstention, in complete contradiction with all that the opposition leaders had been saying for months before, and with no clear alternative being posed, met with no response, other than among the minority of more advanced workers who abstained more out of loyalty to the leaders of their organisations than from conviction. The only criticism offered by the workers' leaders of the Suarez Referendum was that they had not been invited to participate in its elaboration - which was perfectly true. But in view of the fact that their exemplary good behaviour in the previous period had convinced Suarez that he had nothing to fear, why should he have treated them with anything else than contempt?

Here again, the "diplomacy" of the workers' leaders, to their utter dismay and incomprehension, led to the opposite results to what they had intended. It is a situation that has been repeated many times since and still they do not learn.

The Suarez government emerged from the Referendum campaign greatly strengthened. With the help of the leaders of the opposition, principally of the workers' parties, the new regime had acquired respectability in the eyes of the masses, particularly of the middle class and the more politically inert layers of the working class. One of the most celebrated political cartoonists in Spain, "Paredis" of the influential El Pais hit on the idea of portraying Suarez in an imperial pose on the top of a Roman style column, where he has remained ever since, with the opposition leaders standing on each others' shoulders in a vain attempt to conduct negotiations with him "on equal terms".

With a big majority of votes in favour of the government's reform, which undoubtedly reflected the general vague, but deep-rooted desire for change, Suarez was now in a strong position to call a general election, and win a majority. Had elections been held in the first few months after Franco's death, there is no doubt that, in the charged and radicalised atmosphere, the Socialist and Communist parties would have swept to power and the bourgeois parties, not only the fascist but also the "reformist" ones, would have been practically wiped out. 

A cursory glance at the editorials of the serious bourgeois press, not only in Spain but also internationally would reveal the complete collapse of confidence of the capitalist commentators at that time. But the confidence of the ruling class is also a variable factor. The strategists of capital internationally had not taken sufficiently into consideration the absolute bankruptcy of the leaders of the Spanish workers' organisations which unexpectedly gave them the opportunity to regain the initiative, at least in the short run. On the eve of the general election of June 1977, the ruling class had recovered its nerve and the press was now talking in glowing terms of the "Superman Suarez" who had, in their view saved the day. They now confidently looked forward to an electoral victory which would give Suarez the same overwhelming victory he had gained in the Referendum.  

A Bonapartist regime

The strategy of the majority tendency of the ruling class in Spain was to proceed cautiously with the dismantling of the old dictatorship with the intention of installing a monarchist "strong state" along the lines of the Gaullist regime in France. The constitutional illusions of the bourgeoisie were expressed in the words of the President of the influential "21st Century Club" where he talked of "a Crown which, by virtue of its mission of conciliation and arbitration, will give peace, order and understanding to Spain."

The Spanish ruling class has learned something from the British bourgeoisie which for centuries has maintained the Monarchy, at enormous cost, not out of caprice or sentimentality, but as a reserve weapon of reaction, a force which apparently stands above politics and "party interests", but which, in the event of a direct confrontation between the classes, could serve as a rallying point for all the forces of reaction within society and could challenge the legality of a democratically-elected parliament which attempted to carry through socialist measures.

The new-found monarchic enthusiasm of the hard-headed Spanish bankers and industrialists has no other explanation than this. Unfortunately for them, the Spanish Monarchy has neither the same history or roots as its British equivalent, but is seen by the great majority of Spaniards as an artificial graft which is, moreover, tainted by its past connection with the Franco dictatorship. No amount of public relations campaigns can erase that stain, not even with the energetic assistance of the general secretary of the Spanish "Communist Party". At the first attempt to use the Monarchy against the Spanish people, that instrument will break in pieces. 

Mass rally of workers during the 1977 election

Nevertheless, it is a measure of the stupidity and short-sightedness of the Spanish workers' leaders that in the recent discussions on the new Constitution, the MPs of the "Communist" Party voted unanimously in favour of the Monarchy, while those of the Socialist Party only put up a token show of opposition. Even the meek display of resistance by the Socialists provoked the ire of Santiago Carillo who publicly accused the Socialists of irresponsibility in breaking the "consensus" over the question of the Monarchy!

What the leaders of the Spanish workers' organisations cannot or will not understand is the real nature of the plans of the Spanish ruling class, whose main intention, behind all the facade of parliamentarism and "democracy", is to construct a Bonapartist state, with the Monarchy as the focal point of reaction in the future, a second chamber with considerable powers, elected on the kind of franchise which would give more weight to the less populated, more conservative provinces and act as a counter-weight to the lower house (in a similar way to the British House of Lords in the past), and above all, maintaining virtually intact all the old apparatus of repression inherited from the Franco period.

The bourgeoisie hoped that the general elections would result in a strong government, capable of consolidating this type of semi-parliamentarian Bonapartist regime, and on the other hand, confronting the working class with an austerity plan, based on wage restraint and an attack on living standards as a way out of the increasingly severe economic crisis. The new-found confidence of the Spanish capitalists was expressed in the rise in share prices on the Stock Exchange on the eve of the elections. Suarez, the "superman", was riding high on the success of the Referendum campaign. The political parties of the opposition were only just emerging from the twilight world of semi-illegality in which they had found themselves in the previous months. Their apparatus was extremely defective, and they lacked funds and cadres. 

Election result

The new "party" hastily knocked together by Suarez on the eve of the elections, consisting of an ill-assorted rag-bag of "liberals", Social Democrats" and the opportunist ex-fascists of Suarez's camarilla, known disparagingly in the press as "all the President's men", after Nixon's Watergate mafia, enjoyed all the resources of the state machine, unlimited access to television and limitless funds from the banks and monopolies. Just to make sure there would be no slip-ups, the voting system was rigged to deprive the youth and the worker emigrants of votes and give the advantage to the backward rural areas over the industrial centres even in the elections to the Lower House.

On top of that, no fewer than 41 members of the Upper Chamber were directly nominated by the King. To further undermine the workers' parties, the official election period was limited to three weeks, whereas the government party had in effect been conducting its campaign for months.

Yet in spite of these measures, the first relatively "free" elections after 40 years of fascism resulted in an amazing triumph for the workers' parties, and above all for the socialist party, the PSOE. This was no thanks to the vision and foresight of the party leaders who had completely underestimated the potential strength of the socialist vote.

The Marxist tendency in the PSOE had already anticipated a big vote of maybe 30%, whereas in January, Felipe Gonzalez, the general secretary went on record assaying that 15% would be an "acceptable result" for his party. In the event, the PSOE won 33% of the votes, scoring spectacular successes in all the main working class centres of the country. In Madrid, Barcelona, the Basque country and Andalucia, the Socialist Party, after decades of being reduced to a tiny handful struggling for existence, emerged as the main force in the working class.

PSOE amounted to more than 50% of the electorate. In Barcelona the PSOE and PSUC (as the CP is known in Catalonia) completely wiped out the government party, the UCD. In the Basque provinces, the Centre Party was annihilated by the combined forces of the Socialists and Basque nationalists. Only in the most backward regions of Galicia and Old Castille did the UCD get a decent result. And in these areas, the old system of the 'caciques" or local political bosses still prevails which means that large numbers of peasants were certainly compelled to vote as directed by the local landlords and fascist bureaucrats under pain of losing their jobs or homes.

But the real significance of these results lay in the total defeat of reaction. The main right wing party, the "Popular Alliance" of Manual Fraga, which did not dare to openly advocate fascist policies, got less than 10% of the votes, about the same number as the CP. The openly fascist "New Force" (Fuerza Nueva) got only 63,000 votes (0.35%) of the total. This may be compared to the 5 million votes of the PSOE and the 1½ million votes of the PCE.

What these elections demonstrated clearly was precisely the fundamental change in the correlation of class forces in Spanish society. Contrary to all the pathetic bleatings of CarilIo and the Spanish reformists there is no mass social base for reaction in Spain at the present time and the objective situation is enormously favourable to the working class which, with a correct leadership, programme and policy would be entirely capable of effecting the transformation of society without bloodshed and without civil war. 

Electoral statistics are, in themselves an important indicator of the class balance of forces and of the changing moods of the classes within society. But they do not by any means exhaust the question of the relative strength of the classes. The vote for the Centre Party (UCD) for instance, could not by any stretch of the imagination, be seen as a vote for reaction. What that vote represented was the first stirrings of political consciousness among the millions of inert and more politically unaware sections of society - the small shopkeepers, peasants, artisans, housewives.

These sections, in voting for the Centre, were first and foremost expressing their decisive rejection of 40 years of fascist dictatorship. In a confused way they were voting for change for a better life and a better future. The electoral propaganda of the Centre played up to these aspirations of the "small man". Not accidentally, Suarez the ex-fascist chose to fight the elections under the banner of the "Centre", and even described himself as a Social Democrat! Undoubtedly these petty bourgeois masses, in voting UCD, were voting against dictatorship and for democracy. But in the minds of these farmers, small shopkeepers and housewives the idea of democracy was inextricably bound up with the idea of a better, "more European" living standard. Inevitably, it has been precisely these sections in the months following the elections which have moved most swiftly and decisively against the Centre and against the Suarez government. 

Both the opinion polls and the bye-elections in Asturias and Alicante prove conclusively that the middle classes have decisively deserted Suarez and are seeking a radical alternative to a government which has betrayed their hopes and offered them nothing but economic ruin, political instability and social anarchy. 

If the leaders of the PSOE and PCE had the slightest idea of socialism, the great majority of these disillusioned middle-class voters could be won to the side of the working class. Unfortunately, the conduct of the leaders of both parties has proven to be no better after the elections than it was before them. 

Economy 

The misfortune of the Spanish bourgeoisie was that in its attempt to effect the difficult and perilous transition to a Bonapartist semi-parliamentarian regime coincided with the onset of the first major world-wide recession since the Second World War. The increased competition for world markets between the different capitalist countries rapidly exposed the hopelessly uncompetitive character of Spanish industry. In 1976, the deficit of trade was $7,330 million. Even after the devaluation of the peseta carried out by the Suarez government in a desperate attempt to regain a competitive edge for Spanish exports, the deficit of trade stood at $6,363 million at the end of 1977. At the same time, this devaluation represented an indirect attack on living standards, provoking an increase in inflation as a result of the rising cost of imports. Since 60% of all imports consist of raw materials and semi-manufactured products vital to Spanish industry, any depreciation in the value of the currency vis-a-vis other currencies necessarily has the effect of causing big price rises at all levels in a short space of time.

The devaluation therefore had to be accompanied by a package of measures designed to hold down wages and make the workers pay the price of the inefficiency and bankruptcy of Spanish industry, which had been kept in a privileged position for years under Franco, pampered by enormous subsidies and sheltered behind high tariff walls. 

The rate of inflation, which in real terms was approaching the horrendous level of 40% in 1977 had been enormously increased by the increase in the money supply which reached the incredible figure of 23% at its peak last summer. The Suarez government, fearing an early confrontation with Spanish labour, deliberately chose to increase the amount of money in circulation, continue to give cheap credits to industry to keep down unemployment, and allow prices and wages to rise at the very time when all other capitalist countries were carrying out policies of austerity and wage freeze, such as the "social contract" in Britain. This policy, from a capitalist point of view, was suicidal in view of the already uncompetitive nature of Spanish industry and the yawning balance of trade deficit. The capitalist press let out a hue and cry against the government for allowing the economy to drift, inexorably towards catastrophe. 

But on the other hand, Suarez now found himself in an impossible position. Instead of the strong government anticipated by the bourgeoisie prior to the elections; they found themselves with a weak government, which had behind it neither a majority of the votes nor with an absolute majority in parliament. Within a few months after the elections all the opinion polls reflected an absolute collapse of support for the government. 

The rapid rise of inflation provoked a wave of anger and resentment among the middle class as well as the backward sections of the workers and housewives who had voted for Suarez. The scandal of the beating up of the Socialist MP Jaime Blanco by armed police revealed to everyone that precious little had changed since the "good old days" of Franco and Arias Navarro. The simmering discontent of the nationalities again erupted in disorder in the Basque country, massive demonstrations in favour of autonomy in Catalonia, Valencia and Andalucia, which resulted in a fatal shooting in Malaga. A determined offensive on the part of the Socialist and Communist MPs inside and outside Parliament could undoubtedly have brought down the government and forced the convening of new elections in which the workers' parties would have been assured a landslide victory. But this did not occur. Once again the leaders of the PCE and PSOE strove with might and main to arrive at a deal or "consensus" with Suarez and prevent mobilisations of the workers.

In the Autumn of 1977, Suarez convened a series of conversations with the leaders of the opposition parties. By this very fact he indicated that the government could not last a matter of days without the support of the PSOE and PCE leaders. The result was the signing of the notorious Pact of Moncloa, the Spanish equivalent of the British Social Contract. This Pact established a ceiling of 20% for wage increases at a time when even the rigged official index estimated a rise of 30% in the cost of living (the real rate was much higher, as we have stated). On the other hand, the government ordered the Bank of Spain to reduce the increase in the money supply from an annual rate of 23% to 17%. This latter measure had the immediate effect of cutting off funds to industry and causing a massive wave of factory closures, and an enormous increase in unemployment. 

For its part, both the government and the big capitalists initially looked with indifference at the devastating social and economic effects of their policies. The Basque industrialist and "royal" senator Louis Olarra commented "To insist upon maintaining the work force of our factories at this moment in time is suicide ... If there is a big factory which has to suspend payments, it is better that it should do so as soon as possible in order later to attempt to recover it. .. What we cannot do today is to keep a lot of dead ducks."

These words adequately express the point of view of the Spanish monopolists who were quite prepared to shut their factories like so many matchboxes, throwing hundreds of thousands out of work as a means of teaching the workers a lesson, holding down wages and boosting profit margins. The most prominent spokesman of this suicidal policy was Fuentes Quintana, the "strong man" of the Economic Ministry, very highly thought of by the leaders of the PCE and PSOE, who, in all fairness, have never shone in matters of economic theory, or any other theory, if it comes to that. At the time of the signing of the Moncloa Pact, Carillo boasted that these economic measures would solve the economic crisis "within 18 months".

But it did not take eighteen days before the catastrophic effects of this policy became felt. The monetary cut-back, as predicted by the Marxist wing of the PSOE in the pages of their journal Nuevo Claridad, immediately threw the entire economy into a state of turmoil. In the first few months of 1978 there was an average of two factory closures a day in the heavily industrialised Basque province of Vizcaya. In the Basque country as a whole there were 127,000 men out of work out of a population of 972,700 (13.16% of the total) 

Bourgeoisie pessimistic

In the Basque provinces of Guipozcoa, where most Basque is spoken and where practically every family in many villages had one or more member arrested or beaten by the police in connection with the activities of ETA, there are no fewer than 24.54% out of work, mainly youth. Not without reason, the Socialist leader Enrique Mugica recently related the resurgence of terrorism in the Basque country to the problem of mass youth unemployment. And this situation is not peculiar to the Basque country. In Catalonia, the textile industry is in a state of absolute ruin. In Andalucia, the levels of misery, unemployment and actual hunger have alarmed even the bourgeois press which daily publishes reports of the desperate condition of the unemployed in that unhappy region. The generally accepted figure for unemployment is around 1,300,000. But not long ago, an MP of the right wing Popular Alliance Party in a parliamentary debate actually put the figure at two millions, and that estimate may not be far from the truth. In addition, only a small minority of the unemployed in Spain receive any kind of unemployment benefit.

The present economic situation is desperate. The government's measures have partially ameliorated the balance of payments deficit, which, as we have seen, remains high nevertheless. But only at the cost of completely undermining the home market, which remains in a very depressed state. At the close of the first quarter of 1978 the general situation was one of total stagnation of industry, empty order books and plant operating at only 80% of capacity. In some sectors the situation is worse still. Shipbuilding is working at only 60% of capacity and steelmaking at 74%, and still falling. Stocks are rising and, despite all the government's measures, private investment is falling. 

The worry of the situation is that the very capitalists, who were screaming about a reduction in state expenditure only a few months ago, are now complaining bitterly about the shortage of state aid and credit. The truth of the matter is that the Spanish capitalists, after years of leaning like cripples on the crutches of state aid, now find it completely impossible to get along without it. They do not invest in industry and are completely pessimistic about the future. 

The depths of this pessimism are fully revealed in an article written for the Italian newspaper La Stampa (14.4.78) by Antonio Garrigues, President of the Association for the Progress of Management. Significantly, the title of the article is "State Socialism in Spain?" It is worth while quoting a few lines from this article which shows how the thinking representatives of Spanish capitalism view the future: "At this moment the capitalist is not investing, which is the key to the
whole system of the liberal market system (he means the capitalist system, DH). On the other hand, the state is obliged to invest, reducing the space for private initiative (?). As a consequence we see, little by little, the socialisation or statization of the economy." Again: "The possibilities for a really liberal policy to save the market economy are minimal. The Left will control - jointly - the economic activity (of the country) at any moment." 

In these lines you can clearly see the nervousness, almost the hysteria of the bourgeoisie who fear the consequences of the economic collapse yet are impotent to do anything about it. Garrigues goes on to draw an irresistible conclusion: "The Left control 50% of political power, they have the trade union and cultural power. We have to set out from this situatlon. There is no other alternative except to arrive at consensus solutions." (my emphasis DH)

Government unstable

The trembling voice of this spokesman of capital reveals the real situation in Spain far more than all the speeches of Felipe Gonazalez and Santiago Carillo. The intelligent bourgeois understand the enormous power represented by the millions of workers organised in the PCE and PSOE and their respective trade union, the Workers Commissions and the UGT. The recent trade union elections resulted in an enormous strengthening of Spanish trade unionism, with the election of factory committees in the great majority of workplaces throughout the country. At present, something like four million workers are organised in the trade unions, mainly the UGT and Workers' Commissions, and these organisations are still growing, despite the economic crisis and mass unemployment, as the Spanish workers instinctively realise the need to defend themselves against the bosses. No wonder Garrigues paints such a gloomy picture of the "Left" controlling the political, trade union and economic power!

The only way out for Spanish capitalism would be an all-out attack on workers' living standards to restore the profit-margins and business "confidence" of the bourgeoisie. But after four decades of fascist slavery, the Spanish workers are in no mood to tolerate attacks on their hard-won living standards. A move towards reaction and a new dictatorship under these circumstances would be out of the question. While there are undoubtedly a number of lunatics in the general staff of the army and civil guard who fondly dream of a return to July 1936, the overwhelming majority of the bourgeoisie regard such a prospect with undisguised horror. Not for sentimental reasons of course. 

These hard-hearted, cynical gangsters would have no compunction in wading knee-deep in the blood of the workers and their families as they did before, if they thought they had a reasonable prospect of success. But the decisive section of the ruling class clearly understands that the class balance of forces has changed decisively since 1936. Today the working class is a million times stronger, its position in production and in society more decisive. On the other hand, the social reserves of reaction have shrunk practically to nothing in the intervening period. Where today is the backward mass of illiterate, conservative peasants? Where are the Hitlers and Mussolinis? Where are the Moorish mercenaries? The ruling class of Spain have never forgotten that in 1936-37, despite the much more favourable circumstances, the working class gave them a good lesson in the first few months and almost succeeded in taking power.

Had it not been for the paralysing influence exercised then, as now, by conservative and cowardly leaderships, the Spanish workers undoubtedly would have taken power. The bourgeoisie in 1936 came close to losing everything. And today the chances of such a disaster befalling them are greater still, despite the welcome assistance provided by the present day Prietos and Ibarruris. For that reason, the Spanish bourgeoisie keeps its military adventurers on a tight rein. In the words of Garrigues, it is not the moment for confrontation but "consensus solutions". 

The trouble is that the present government has proved woefully inadequate to deliver, the goods, as far as the bourgeoisie is concerned. The bourgeois press is ever more critical of Suarez and his government But what alternative is there?

For some months now the idea has been canvassed of the entry of the Socialist leaders into a government of coalition. Not long ago, one of the PSOE leaders, Alfonso Guerra stated that the Socialists could bring down the Suarez government in 48 hours. The reason why they chose not to do so was that they were not sure what the reaction to a Socialist government would be on the part of the bankers, capitalists, Church and army generals! For some time, the right wing of the PSOE leadership, headed by Enrique Mugica and Luis Solana have been engaged in semi-secret discussion with the leaders of the so-called "social democratic" wing of the UCD led by Fernandez Ordonez. The idea was apparently to form a coalition with this wing of the UCD after a split in Suarez's increasingly divided party.

Bye-elections

The prospect for holding the Suarez government together looks more remote every day. On every major issue, splits and dissensions break out within the government party which has never satisfactorily been unified. The economic catastrophe of Fuentes Quintana's deflationary package led to the summary dismissal of the unfortunate professor and his replacement by the more pliant Alvil Martorell, Undoubtedly, this reflects a change in the government's economic policy, and not accidentally.

The collapse of factory after factory brought the social tensions to a head in a series of sensitive regions of the country. Already last autumn, the threat to close the shipyards in Cadiz brought practically the whole working population in to the streets in a violent demonstration in which the police found themselves bombarded from the rooftops of the workers' flats with "heavy objects" including a sewing machine and a fridge! At the other end of Spain in the troubled Basque provinces, the threatened closure of the big steel factory, Babcock and Wilcox which put 30,000 jobs in jeopardy in the Bilbao area brought about a one-day general stoppage and the threat of a factory occupation which, if it should materialise, would threaten to spark off a wave of sit-ins throughout Spain.

Frightened by the consequences of their own policies, the Suarez government has once again retreated in panic, allowing the money supply to rise again, and offering· new credits to industry to prevent more factory closures. But such a policy can only result in a new twist in the inflationary spiral. At the close of 1977, the budget deficit stood at 80,000 million pesetas (£1:145 ps). A further increase in subsidies can only result in an increased budget deficit, rising inflation and the undermining of the advantages of the devaluation of the peseta, which will cause a new balance of payments crisis, leading to a new devaluation and so on.

The position of Spanish capitalism is desperate. And the fundamental reason for the crisis is the inability to stage a head-on collision with the working class because of the enormous accumulated strength of Spanish labour.

The hopeless floundering of the Suarez government, the desperate economic situation, the festering sore of the national question, continual terrorist outbreaks and brutal police repression, all add up to an extremely explosive combination.

The extremely weak position of the Suarez government was clearly indicated 'in the recent bye-elections in Asturias and Alicante. In Alicante, the Centre's vote was reduced from 35.4% to 31.15%. In Asturias (Oviedo) it collapsed from 31% to 23.4%. In the latter province the difference between the government party and the PCE was only 800 votes! The process of polarisation was clear in both constituencies, but especially in Asturias, where a series of very radical strikes and occupations in the mining industry formed the background to the election campaign. In Asturias, PSOE and PCE were more than 55%, and in Alicante, more than 51%. All this indicates that if general elections were held at the present time, the workers' parties would walk home. 

Nevertheless, the recent elections also revealed a high percentage of abstentions, in contrast to the massive turn-out at the general elections last year. Also the vote of the PSOE registered a slight decline, whereas the vote of the PCE increased, in the case of Asturias, to a significant degree. This fact demonstrates that the middle class and the, more backward sections of the working class is thoroughly disenchanted with the results of 12 months of "democratic" bourgeois government and registered its protest by abstaining in a bye-election which could not determine the future government of the country.

No doubt in a general election this pattern would not be repeated, and the main beneficiary would be the PSOE. But the fact cannot be denied that the incredibly short-sighted and foolish policy of Felipe Gonzalez in the recent months materially contributed to the loss of votes by the Socialist party. Under the pressure of Willy Brandt and the leaders of the Second International, the leaders of the PSOE have moved steadily to the right in the recent period, abandoning all of the radical phraseology which characterised their position in the underground period. In a vain attempt to "win the middle ground", Gonzalez, following in the footsteps of Carillo, attempted to give the party a "moderate" and "respectable" image which he foolishly imagined would appeal to the middle class voters.

After the PCE had formally abandoned Leninism at the recent Congress, Gonzalez decided, apparently without consulting the Executive of the PSOE, that the time had come for the Socialist Party to "go one better" and formally abandon Marxism! This "respectable" posturing, which threw the Socialist Party into turmoil and caused the leaders to beat a hasty retreat under the pressure of the angry rank-and-file, conspicuously failed to win the votes of the middle class but certainly lost the party thousands of working class votes which ironically passed to the PCE, notably in Asturias.

The real reason for the mass abstention and the slight drop in the Socialist vote is that these sections have radically turned against the Centre but, as the result of a total lack of serious opposition from the workers' leaders, can see no fundamental difference between the parties and register this protest against "all politicians" by not voting. A serious campaign of opposition, mobilising the workers in meetings and demonstrations in every factory, workers' district, village and university would galvanise support for the PSOE. But the "practical" policies of parliamentary posturings and wheeling and dealing with the Centre only serve to repel and demoralise the middle classes who draw the conclusion that "they're all the same". Nevertheless in spite of themselves, the PSOE and PCE leaders will gain enormously in a general election where the issue is posed point blank of "who shall govern Spain for the next period."

At times, when considering the behaviour of the workers' leaders in Spain, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they do not really want to win power. The impression is irresistible that the Socialists, in particular, are tom between the desire to hold ministerial portfolios and fear of the consequences of being in the government at a time of rising class struggles and desperate economic crisis. The revolt of the rank-and-file against Gonzalez's attempt to drop the word "Marxism" from the party programme was an indication of what could be expected if the Spanish Socialist leaders were to attempt to repeat the experiences of the present Labour government in Britain in the Spanish context. 

Degenerate

The leaders of the PSOE understand that, once in power, it would not be easy to abandon their programme without provoking enormous opposition in the ranks of the party. Yet, on the other side, they know that against the background of world capitalist crisis, any attempt to carry through their programme of reforms will meet with the implacable resistance of the capitalist class. The Socialist leaders will find themselves between the hammer and the anvil, with the workers and the rank-and-file pressing them to carry out their programme and the bankers and industrialists pressing them to reduce living standards to "save the country". All this is quite sufficient to explain the reluctance of Felipe Gonzalez to bring about the fall of Suarez "at this moment in time".

For their part, the leaders of the "Communist" Party, utterly degenerate from a Marxist point of view, show no such restraint. Carillo and the rest are positively eager to "assume the responsibilities of office" and enter the government on practically any terms. With the break from Moscow, the leadership of the PCE no longer acts, as it did in the 1930s as the conscious agents of the Russian bureaucracy and increasingly acts instead as the ally of "its" bourgeoisie. The "nationalism" of the Spanish C.P. leaders vis-a-vis the Kremlin finds its counterpart in its desire to acquire the image of a "national" "patriotic" "Spanish" party whose first concern is the "national" interest, which, as it happens, is the same "national" interest defended by the right wing Social Democrats, Suarez, the King, or, for that matter Fraga.

It is a supreme irony of history, that precisely at the moment when capitalism is foundering in the worst crisis of recent times, and when the whole system of so-called "private enterprise" is falling apart at the seams, the leaders of the so-called "Communist" Party express their confidence in the future health and well-being of the "mixed economy", loudly denying their intention to nationalise the banks or anything else for that matter. Carillo is fêted for his "statesmanlike wisdom" in the pages of the bourgeois press. But his policy of breaking away from Moscow has opened up a Pandora's box of criticism and internal dissent within the ranks of the party. At the recent congress of the PCE which formally renounced Leninism, a whole series of cracks and dissensions were already visible. The Catalan CP (PSUC) refused to accept the decision. Not accidentally the mass opposition to the change came from the worker elements in the Workers' Commissions.

On the First of May Demonstration in Madrid many CP members were to be seen sporting a badge with the inscription: "I am faithful to Lenin". It is clear from all this that the PCE leaders can no longer count upon the same blind obedience to their policies which they enjoyed in the past. The old monolith has finally been broken. Carillo will soon discover that it is not possible to maintain a Stalinist discipline in the absence of a Stalinist policy. The entry of the PCE into the government would inevitably spell big movements of opposition along the same lines as in the PSOE. 

However, Carillo's anxiety to get hold of a ministerial portfolio will be delayed for a while yet. The Communist party is too small to be a decisive force in the game of parliamentary manoeuvering. The leaders of the PSOE are in no hurry to enter the government. And the bourgeoisie, in spite of the difficulties it faces, is not very keen on the idea either.

 

Alfonso Suarez

At the present moment in time, the Spanish ruling class cannot do anything right. On the economic plane, neither a policy of deflation nor of inflation will solve its problems, and either course will inevitably lead, sooner or later to a head-on conflict with the working class. This autumn, Spanish industry faces yet another round of collective bargaining for the new wage contracts. The nightmare of a new wave of strikes haunts the capitalist and bourgeois ministers who fear, with every reason, that anyone of these strikes could spark off violent conflict with the intervention of the armed police or so-called "uncontrolled" fascist hooligans. And the recent events in Pamplona and Renteria showed with what speed such conflicts can become generalised. Them government was fortunate that these events took place at the start of the Summer holidays when a huge part of the workers were already away on holiday. Had this outbreak occurred in October, things could have taken a very different turn, and the bourgeoisie is well aware of this.

 On the political plane, the ruling class now has precious little faith left in Suarez and his rag tag and bobtail government. But what alternative is there? Despite all the assurances and the "moderate" stance of the leaders of the PSOE and the PCE the strategists of capital look with dread at the possible entry of the workers' leaders into the government. They do not fear the individual labour leaders. But unlike these leaders, the representatives of capital make a careful distinction between what is said by the Communist and Socialist leaders and the class forces which stand behind them. They fear that, by allowing the workers' leaders into the government, they will open the floodgates and cause a wave of radicalisation which will place the labour leaders under enormous pressure to grant concessions which Spanish capitalism is not prepared to give. Under the irresistible pressure of the masses, the workers' representatives in the government might be forced to go far further than they themselves had intended or foreseen. Therefore, the bourgeoisie, lacking all confidence in the Suarez government, has no alternative but to back it and strive to maintain it in power for as long as possible.

In this, as always, they have received every assistance from the leaders of the PCE and PSOE who missed yet another opportunity to unleash a mass campaign against the government on the issue of the new Constitution, which one Socialist deputy correctly described as "the most reactionary in Europe". This constitution which enshrines the Monarchy, the Upper Chamber, the capitalist system, the special position of the Catholic Church and the employers' right to lock-out, has been approved by both the PCE and PSOE, although the Socialists at least made a token resistance to a series of the most reactionary points, much to the chagrin of Carillo. By so doing, the leaders of the two main workers' parties yet again played into the hands of Suarez whose intention is clearly to repeat his earlier trick of convening a Referendum (this time on the Constitution) and then, on the basis of an overwhelming "yes" vote, move rapidly to new general elections (possibly with the long-delayed local government elections in between). Given the support of the PSOE and PCE a big "yes" vote is inevitable, with the important exception of the Basque country, where it is not ruled out that the Constitution, which explicitly rejects the right of self-determination, may actually have a majority against. 

Marxist leadership 

The refusal to concede the right of self-determination to the Basques, Catalans, and other minority nationalities will lay the seeds of further violence, bloodshed and deaths in the coming period. For this reason alone, it was the duty of the PCE and PSOE MPs to oppose the Constitution. The Spanish bourgeoisie hoped that the measures of autonomy granted to the Basques and Catalans which permit them a certain limited control over their affairs would satisfy the nationalists, and undoubtedly the Catalan and Basque capitalists would be prepared to come to an agreement which would protect their power and privilege within the Spanish state without leading to actual independence.

But with the deepening of the social crisis, the worsening of unemployment and the spread of terrorism and right-wing violence, there is a real danger that the demand for separation would begin to gain a mass hearing, particularly in the troubled Basque provinces. The present campaign of ETA is a warning that the national question in the Basque country is far from being resolved and will, in fact, become exacerbated by the general crisis of Spanish capitalism.

The talk about the "Ulsterisation" of the Basque country can take on a terrible reality in the coming months and years unless the forces of Spanish Marxism can succeed in winning the majority of the Spanish labour movement for the kind of policies and programme which alone are capable of winning the entire proletariat of the Spanish state: Andalucians, Basques, Catalans, Galicians, Castilians, on a common programme of struggle, beginning with the democratic demands which, in spite of what the reformist labour leaders say, still remains to be won: full trade union freedom, amnesty for all political prisoners and re-admission of all sacked workers, democratic and trade union rights for civil servants and members of the armed forces, abolition of the Monarchy and the Upper Chamber, dissolution of all repressive bodies and popular trial for those responsible for fascist crimes against the people, the right of self-determination, a revolutionary Constituent Assembly-democratically elected by all citizens from 18 years of age.

But such a programme of sweeping democratic demands would not stop there. A genuinely representative Constituent Assembly composed of the representatives of the workers, peasants, small shopkeepers and housewives would go on to eliminate the social basis of reaction by expropriating the banks and the monopolies of the 100 families which retain their stranglehold over Spanish society today, just as they did under Franco. 

Only the working class, organised under the leadership of a mass party with a Marxist leadership and a Marxist programme will be capable of ending the nightmare of class and national oppression, establish the Iberian Federation of Socialist Republics and set about the socialist transformation of society.

(Sept 4th 1978)