In this section: July 1931 - August 1933, Trotsky's writings on:
a) Tactics flowing from the July election of a coalition government
b) Once again, the National Question in Catalonia
c) The Strike Wave and the Anarcho-Syndicalists
d) "Juntas" or "Factory Committees"?
e) The Stalinists mistaken analysis of the defeat of Sanjurjo
f) Building the Left Opposition in Spain (on which Trotsky's writings were particularly focussed):
i) On relations with Maurin's Catalan Federation and building sympathisers around the Left Opposition
ii) On publishing - and then not publishing - a weekly paper
iii) On the importance of international discussion
iv) On the (concerning) state of the Left Opposition in Spain
v) On the leadership of Andres Nin
Context to this section of writings
The prefaces to the Pathfinder Press collection of Trotsky's writings on the Spanish Revolution summarises events in this period as set out below:
"The June elections were swept by the pro-government parties. The various rightist parties captured a total of only 60 seats in the Cortes to 116 for the Socialist Party alone. The rest of the seats were divided as follows: Radical Socialists, 60; Azaña's Republican Action Party, 30; Lerroux's Radicals, 90; Catalan Esquerra, 43; Alcalá Zamora's Progressive Party, 22; and 16 seats to the Gallegan Nationalists of Casares Quiroga. All of these last-named parties supported the republic.
Within the new Cortes the most hotly contested issue was the privileged position of the church. Outside, among the radicalised workers and agricultural laborers, the issues were land reform, workers' control, and wages.
The divisions among the bourgeois parties over clericalism were not reflected in their attitude toward the workers' movement; there the republican government employed the same methods of forcible suppression as its monarchist predecessors.
In July and August the CNT (anarcho-syndicalist trade union federation) organised a series of local general strikes. The most sharply fought of these was in Seville, where Azaña ordered the military to use artillery against the workers' districts.
The republican coalition, united in opposition to the working class, began to splinter over the question of the church. In October, Alcalá Zamora and (conservative minister of the interior) Maura resigned in a gesture of support for the church hierarchy. Azaña became prime minister, while Lerroux and his Radical Party broke with the republican bloc to move first to the bourgeois centre and finally to the far right. Alcalá Zamora chose not to desert the government altogether and accepted the titular post of president of the republic ...
To win the the confidence of the monarchist generals, Azaña supported them in their persecution of republican junior officers. The generals meanwhile had bolder plans. In August 1932 the commander of the customs guards, General José Sanjurjo, led a rising against the government. Backed by sections of the monarchists and the nascent fascist movement, and promised support by Mussolini, the coup nevertheless failed and its principal organisers were jailed.
After Sanjurjo's defeat, the initiative for a time passed to the workers' organizations. The Anarchists seized the town of Casas Viejas in January 1933. The brutal suppression of this rebellion by the government quickly alienated many Socialist and Anarchist workers from the regime.
Municipal elections in April showed a marked decline of the government's support. By mid-summer, Azaña felt compelled to resign, and new elections were called for November. This time the vote went heavily against the republicans and Socialists".
Felix Morrow, in his 'Civil War in Spain' adds the following:
"The workers and, above all, the peasantry were thoroughly bewildered ... Who were their friends? The republican-socialists had promised land but did not give it ... The republic had killed and jailed the brave peasants of Castilblanco and Casas Viejas. In vain did the socialists argue and plead - the peasants knew their own misery.
The end came quite quickly. In June 1933, Zamora tried to dismiss the coalition but was out-manoeuvred, while the socialists announced that any further attempt would be met by a general strike. It proved an empty threat. It is doubtful whether the bewildered and discouraged workers would have responded to a call; they had been held in leash too long! Three months later, Zamora struck again, dismissing the cabinet and simultaneously dissolving the Cortes. Lerroux was appointed Premier.
The elections were held in November; the victory of the coalition of reactionaries and rightists was decisive. The socialists offered many explanations: the embittered anarchists had effectively campaigned for a boycott of the elections; the communists had run separate tickets; the women were under clerical influence and voting the first time; the socialists - running independent tickets in most places, under the pressure of the rank and file - fell victim to their own stupid provisions for electoral machinery; the local bosses and landowners terrorised the villages and bought votes; the elections were fraudulent in many places, etc., etc.
But this was a poor alibi and its details, indeed, were proof of the failure of the republican-socialist coalition to win and inspire the masses or to crush the reaction in two and a half years of rule...
As a witness for our analysis of the causes of the victory of reaction, we introduce (leader of the right-wing of the Socialist Party) Indalecio Prieto. In a mood of extreme honesty and frankness, on fleeing to Paris after the October 1934 revolt, Prieto told Le Petit Journal, in answer to the question. 'How do you explain the discontent in Spain, and the success of (the right-wing) Gil Robles in the last elections?':
'Precisely because of the right policy of the left regime,' said Prieto, 'this government born with the republic and created by the republic became the rampart of forces adverse to the republic. ... In this period of perishing capitalism, the Spanish bourgeoisie could not carry through even the bourgeois-democratic revolution.' "
a) Tactics flowing from the July election of a coalition government
Trotsky, analysing newspaper reports from Turkey, where he was in exile, wrote the following on July 1 1931:
"As expected, the Socialists appear to have won a great victory. This is the crux of the parliamentary situation: the Socialist leaders consider themselves lucky because they do not have a majority in the Cortes, and because their coalition with the bourgeoisie is thus justified by parliamentary statistics. The Socialists do not want to take power, for they justly fear that a Socialist government will only be a stage on the road to the dictatorship of the proletariat.
From Prieto's speech (the leader of the right-wing of the Socialist Party) it is clear that the Socialists intend to support the coalition as long as it is possible to hold back the proletariat by doing so and then, when the pressure of the workers becomes too strong, to pass into opposition, under some radical pretext, leaving it to the bourgeoisie to discipline and crush the workers.
In other words, we have before us a variant of Ebert (leader of the right-wing of the SPD in Germany, who presided over the execution of Liebknecht and Luxemburg in 1919) and Tseretelli (leading Russian Menshevik in 1917). Let us remember that Ebert's line was successful, while Tseretelli's failed, and that the decisive factor in both cases was the strength of the Communist Party and its policy.
We must immediately expose the plan of the Socialists (their game of playing to lose) ... But exposing them alone is not enough. There must be a clear political slogan, corresponding to the character of the present stage of the Spanish revolution. The results of the elections make that slogan absolutely clear: the workers must break the coalition with the bourgeoisie and force the Socialists to take power. The peasants must help the workers, if they want to get the land.
The Socialists will say they cannot give up the coalition because they do not have a majority in the Cortes. Our answer to that is to call for democratic elections to the Cortes on the basis of a truly universal and equal suffrage for men and women from eighteen years of age. In other words, to the nondemocratic, falsified Cortes, we counterpose at this stage a truly popular, truly democratic, honestly elected Cortes. ...
"There is not a single communist in the Cortes (according to the Turkish press available to Trotsky - actually, as Broué notes, the Communist Party did manage to elect just one deputy, Doctor Cayetano Bolivar, in Málaga, although perhaps "less for his program than for his reputation as ‘the doctor of the poor.’"). Of course, the revolutionary wing is always stronger in action, in the struggle, than in parliamentary representation. Nevertheless, there is a certain relationship between the strength of a revolutionary party and its parliamentary representation. The weakness of Spanish communism is fully disclosed.
Under these conditions, to speak of the overthrow of bourgeois parliamentarianism by the dictatorship of the proletariat would simply mean to play the part of imbeciles and babblers. The task is to gather strength for the party on the basis of the parliamentary stage of the revolution and to rally the masses to us. That is the only way that parliamentarianism can be overcome. ...
On the one hand, we must consider the general direction of the revolutionary development, which determines our strategic line. On the other hand, we must take into account the level of consciousness of the masses; the communist who does not take that into consideration will break his neck.
Let us consider for a moment the way in which the Spanish workers en masse should view the present situation. Their leaders, the Socialists, have power. This increases the demands and tenacity of the workers. Every striker will not only have no fear of the government but will also expect help from it. The communists must direct the thoughts of the workers pre cisely along those lines: "Demand everything of the government, since your leaders are in it." ...
If we simply counterpose the dictatorship of the proletariat or the soviets to the Cortes, we will succeed only in driving the workers to the Socialists, for both will say: The communists want to rule us. But under the slogan of democracy and of an end to the coalition between the Socialists and the bourgeoisie, we drive a wedge between the workers and the Social pare the next stage of the revolution.
All the considerations mentioned above would remain a dead letter if we were to limit ourselves only to democratic slogans in the parliamentary sense. There can be no question of this. Communists participate in all strikes, in all protests and demonstrations, arousing more and more numerous strata of the population. Communists are with the masses and at the head of the masses in every battle.
On the basis of these battles, the communists put forward the slogan of the soviets, and at the first opportunity build soviets as the organisations of the proletarian united front. ...
In boldly developing our agrarian program, we must by no means forget about the independent role of the agricultural workers. They are the main instruments of the proletarian revolution in the rural districts. With the peasants, the workers have an alliance, but the agricultural workers are a part of the proletariat itself. This important distinction must always be kept in mind".
b) Once again, the National Question in Catalonia
In July 1931, Trotsky wrote further on the National Question in Catalonia, making an analogy with the Balkans:
"Maurin, the "leader" of the Workers and Peasants Bloc, shares the point of view of separatism. After certain hesitations, he has reconciled himself with the left wing of petty-bourgeois nationalism. ...
What does the program of separatism mean? - the economic and political dismemberment of Spain, or in other words, the transformation of the Iberian Peninsula into a sort of Balkan Peninsula, with independent states divided by customs barriers, and with independent armies conducting independent Hispanic wars.
Are the workers and peasants of the various parties of Spain interested in the economic dismemberment of Spain? Not at all. That is why to identify the decisive struggle for the right to self-determination with propaganda for separatism means to accomplish a fatal task. Our program is for Hispanic federation with the indispensable maintenance of economic unity. We have no intention of imposing this program upon the oppressed nationalities of Spain with the aid of the arms of the bourgeoisie. In this sense, we are sincerely for the right to self-determination. If Catalonia separates, the communist minority of Catalonia, as well as of Spain, will have to conduct a struggle for federation".
In September, Trotsky wrote further to clarify his reference to 'Balkanization', making clear the need to call for an 'Iberian Soviet Federation':
"You describe how one might unintentionally aid Madrilenian liberalism by proclaiming that the Balkanization of the Iberian Peninsula is inconsistent with the aims of the proletariat, and by proclaiming it without further elaboration. You are quite right. If I have not underscored it sufficiently in my preceding letter, I am prepared to do so ten times over right now.
The analogy between the two peninsulas really needs to be completed. There was a time when the Balkan Peninsula was unified under the domination of the Turkish gentry, the militarists, and the proconsuls. The oppressed people longed to overthrow their oppressors. If our opposition to partitioning the peninsula had been counterposed to these aspirations of the people, we would have been acting as lackeys to the Turkish pashas and beys.
On the other hand, however, we know that the Balkan peoples, liberated from the Turkish yoke, have been at one another's throats for decades. In this matter, too, the proletarian vanguard can apply the point of view of the permanent revolution: liberation from the imperialist yoke, which is the most important element of the democratic revolution, leads immediately to the Federation of Soviet Republics as the state form for the proletarian revolution.
Not opposing the democratic revolution, but on the contrary supporting it completely even in the form of separation (that is, supporting the struggle but not the illusions), we at the same time bring our own independent position into the democratic revolution, recommending, counselling, encouraging the idea of the Soviet Federation of the Iberian Peninsula as a constituent part of the United States of Europe. Only under this form is my conception complete.
Needless to say, the Madrid comrades and the Spanish comrades in general should use discretion with regard to the Balkanization argument. particularly great discretion with regard to the Balkanisation argument".
c) The Strike Wave and the Anarcho-Syndicalists
Morrow in 'The Civil War in Spain' explains how the Coalition Government had immediately introduced anti-union legislation, for example outlawing 'political' strikes, requiring prior notice of action to be given to employers, and imposing compulsory arbitration.
The "tumultuous strike wave" (as Trotsky describes it) that broke out following the elections, in July and August, was met with harsh repression. The army were called upon to crush the strikes, leading to hundreds of casualties on the side of the workers.
Trotsky wrote the following in August 1931:
"First of all, it is necessary to make clear that this violent elemental outburst of strikes is the inevitable outcome of the character of the revolution itself, being in a certain sense its basis.
The overwhelming majority of the Spanish proletariat does not know what organisation means. During the time the dictatorship lasted, a new generation of workers grew up, lacking in independent political experience. The revolution awakens - and in this lies its force - the most backward, downtrodden, the most oppressed toiling masses. The strike is the form of their awakening.
By means of the strike, various strata and groups of the proletariat announce themselves, signal to one another, verify their own strength and the strength of their foe. One layer awakens and infects another. All this together makes the present strike wave absolutely inevitable. Least of all do the communists have to be afraid of it, for this is the very expression of the creative force of the revolution.
Only through these strikes, with all their mistakes, with all their "excesses" and "exaggerations," does the proletariat rise to its feet, assemble itself as a unit, begin to feel and to conceive of itself as a class, as a living historical force. Never have revolutions developed under a conductor's stick. Excesses, mistakes, sacrifices are the very nature of any revolution. ....
The Communist Party must enter wholeheartedly into the arena of the developing "elemental" or semi-elemental strike movement, not in order to hold it back, but in order to learn to direct it, and in the very process of the struggle, acquire authority and strength ...
It would be a mistake to think that the present movement was provoked by the anarcho-syndicalists. The latter are themselves under indomitable pressure from below. The leading group of the syndicalist nucleus would like to slow up the movement. One cannot doubt that along this line will grow the differentiation among the anarcho-syndicalists. The most revolutionary wing, the further it goes, will find itself ever more in conflict with the syndico-reformists. From this, left-wing putschists, heroic adventurists, individual terrorists, and others will inevitably surge up.
Needless to say, we cannot encourage any kind of adventurism. But we must make sure in advance that not the right wing, which combats the strikes, but the left revolutionary syndicalist wing will come closer to us. It will be all the easier to overcome all kinds of adventurist elements, the sooner the revolutionary syndicalists are convinced that the communists are fighters - not rationalisers. ...
In summary, the danger of the June days (the defeated Paris uprising of 1848 - similar to the 'July Days' in Russia in 1917) remains without any doubt the gravest in perspective; but the most immediate danger for the communists may become abstract arguing, "trying to appear intelligent," abstract coaxing, which revolutionary workers will regard as pessimistic croaking. ...
The Left Opposition must not forget for a single moment that the dangers arising from the development of the revolution should be overcome not by watchful caution but by audacity, audacity, and more audacity".
In November 1931, in an article on the situation in Germany, Trotsky added in relation to Spain:
" The syndicalist traditions of the Spanish proletariat have now been revealed as one of the most important obstacles in the way of the development of the revolution. ...
The extraordinary delay of the proletarian vanguard lagging behind the events, the politically dispersed character of the heroic struggles of the working masses, the actual assurances of reciprocity between anarcho-syndicalism and Social Democracy - these are the fundamental political conditions that made it possible for the republican bourgeoisie, in league with the Social Democracy, to establish an apparatus of repression, and by dealing the insurgent masses blow for blow, to concentrate a considerable amount of political power in the hands of the government.
By this example, we see that fascism is not at all the only method of the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the revolutionary masses. ... In the absence of a strong revolutionary party of the proletariat, a combination of semi-reforms, left phrases, and gestures still more to the left, and reprisals, can prove to be of much more effective service to the bourgeoisie than fascism".
d) "Juntas" or "Factory Committees?
In September 1931, Trotsky returned to the 'slogan of soviets', suggesting a different way to raise the same idea of united front organisation:
"In a previous letter, I expressed several ideas in this connection. ... It appears that the slogan of "juntas" is associated in the minds of Spanish workers with the slogan of soviets; and for this reason it seems too sharp, too decisive, too "Russian" to them. That is to say, they look at it in a different light than did the Russian workers at a corresponding stage. ...
This question must be given the utmost attention in private conversations with workers in different parts of the country. At any event, if the slogan of soviets (juntas) fails as yet to meet with a response, then we must concentrate on the slogan of factory committees. ... On the basis of factory committees, we can develop the soviet organisation without referring to them by name. ...
We succeeded in creating soviets in Russia only because the demand for them was raised, not by us alone, but by the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries as well, although, to be sure, they had different aims in mind. We cannot create any soviets in Spain precisely because neither the Socialists nor the syndicalists want soviets. This means that the united front and organisational unity with the majority of the working class cannot be created under this slogan.
But here is Caballero (then, as a Socialist Party representative, Minister of Labour in the Coalition Government - only afterwards to move to the left) himself, under the pressure of the masses, forced to seize upon the slogan of workers' control and thereby opening wide the doors for the united-front policy and forging an organisation that embraces the majority of the working class.
We must grab this with both hands. Certainly, Caballero will try to transform workers' control into the control of the capitalists over the workers. But that question already pertains to another subject, that of the relationship of forces within the working class. If we succeed in creating factory committees all over the country, then in this revolutionary epoch that we are witnessing, Messrs. Caballero and his associates will have lost the decisive battle".
e) The Stalinists mistaken analysis of the defeat of Sanjurjo
In September 1932, Trotsky wrote an article entitled "The Spanish Kornilovs and the Spanish Stalinists" in response to a Pravda article on Spain:
Trotsky writes that "The (Pravda) article says: "After the defeat of the general strike in January (an uprising in Catalonia led by the FAI in which the the Bolshevik-Leninists participated) the Trotskyists ["here follow some ritualistic insults" notes Trotsky!] asserted that the revolution was beaten and that the period of defeats had come." Is this true? If there are revolutionaries in Spain who in January of this year were ready to bury the revolution, they do not have and can not have anything in common with the Left Opposition. ...
The tide of revolution permits ebbs and flows. Incidentally, the art of leadership consists in not ordering an offensive at the moment of ebb, and not retreating at the moment of floodtide. ...
After the defeat of the January general strike, it was evident that what was involved was a partial ebbing of the revolution in Spain. Only babblers and adventurers can ignore the ebb. But only panic-mongers and deserters can speak of the liquidation of the revolution as a consequence of a partial retreat. ...
The partial retreat and lull of the Spanish revolution gave impetus to the counterrevolution. After defeat in a big battle the masses fall back and quiet down. An insufficiently tempered leadership is often inclined to exaggerate the extent of the defeat. All this encourages the extremist wing of the counterrevolution. Such is the political mechanism of the monarchist attempt of General Sanjurjo.
But what especially awakens the masses like the crack of a whip is the emergence of the mortal enemy of the people into the arena. It is not rare in such cases for the revolutionary leadership to be caught unawares.
"The swiftness and ease with which the generals' revolt was smashed," writes Pravda, "shows that the forces of the revolution are not broken. The revolutionary upsurge has received a new push from the events of August 10." This is perfectly true. One could also say that this is the only correct passage in the whole article".
Was the Spanish Communist Party taken unawares by the events? Judging only by testimony in Pravda, one would have to answer affirmatively. The article is entitled "The Workers Defeat the General." Evidently, without the revolutionary intervention of the workers against the monarchist coup d'etat, Zamora and not Sanjurjo would have been forced to go into exile. In other words, at the price of their heroism and their blood, the workers helped the republican bourgeoisie hold on to the power, Pretending not to see that, Pravda writes: "The Communist Party fought ... against the right-wing coup d'etat in such a way as to give not even a shadow of support to the present counterrevolutionary government."
What the Communist Party intends is one thing; but what counts now is the result of its efforts. The monarchist wing of the propertied classes tried to remove the republican wing, although the republicans had taken pains not to provoke the monarchists. But the proletariat entered the picture. "The Workers Defeat the General." The monarchists go into exile and the republican bourgeoisie stays in power. How, in the face of such facts, can it be maintained that the Communist Party has not given "a shadow of support to the present counter revolutionary government?"
From what has been said, does it follow that the Communist Party should wash its hands of the conflict between the monarchists and the republican bourgeoisie? Such a policy would have been suicidal ... Only if the Spanish workers were strong enough to take power themselves could their intervention in a decisive struggle against the monarchists not have given momentary aid to their enemy, the republican bourgeoisie.
In August 1917, the Bolsheviks were much stronger than the Spanish Communists were in August 1932. But even the Bolsheviks could not possibly have won power by themselves in the struggle against Kornilov. Thanks to the victory of the workers over the Kornilovists, Kerensky's government lasted another two months. ...
The Spanish proletariat has shown itself to be strong enough to overcome the revolt of the generals, but too weak to take power. Under such conditions, the heroic struggle of the workers could not help but strengthen - even if only temporarily - the republican government. ...
The misfortune of the Stalinist bureaucracy is that neither in Spain nor in Germany does it see the real contradictions that exist in the enemy camp, that is, the living classes and their struggle. The "fascist" Primo de Rivera is replaced by the "fascist" Zamora allied to "social fascists." It is not surprising that with such a theory, the intervention of the masses in the conflict between the monarchists and the republicans took the Stalinists by surprise. ...
The intervention of the mass of workers into the conflict between the two camps of exploiters has given a serious forward impulse to the Spanish revolution. The Azaña government found itself obliged to order the confiscation of manorial estates, a measure which, a few weeks earlier, was as remote as the Milky Way.
If the Communist Party had noticed the differences between the real classes and their political organisations, if it had foreseen the real march of events, if it had criticised and exposed its enemies on the basis of their real sins and crimes, then the masses would have seen the Azaña government's new agrarian reform as the effect of Communist Party policy and would have said to themselves: We must go forward with more energy under its leadership.
If the German Communist Party (in the struggle against Hitler) had embarked confidently and decisively on the line of the united front, which the whole situation called for, and if it had criticised the Social Democrats not for their "fascism" but for their weakness, their waverings, their cowardice in the struggle against Bonapartism and fascism, then the masses would have learned something by the common struggle and by the criticisms, and they would have aligned themselves more decisively behind the Communist Party.
In view of the current policy of the Communist International the masses are convinced at each new turn of events that not only do their class enemies not do what the communists had predicted but also that the Communist Party itself at the crucial moment abandons everything it had taught. This is why confidence in the Communist Party does not grow. And that is why the danger arises in part that Azaña's weak agrarian reform will only profit the bourgeoisie and not the proletariat.
Under exceptional and favourable conditions, the working class can triumph even with bad leadership. But exceptionally favourable conditions are rare. The proletariat must learn to win under less favourable conditions. Besides, the leadership of the Stalinist bureaucracy as experience in every country shows, and as the events of each new month confirm - prevents the communists from utilising favourable conditions to strengthen their ranks, to manoeuvre actively, to distinguish among groupings of enemies or semi-enemies and allied forces.
In other words, the Stalinist bureaucracy has become the most important internal obstacle on the road to victory for the proletarian revolution".
f) Building the Left Opposition in Spain (on which Trotsky's writings were particularly focussed)
Trotsky's writings over these two years indicate an increasing frustration at the mistakes being made by Nin and others within the leadership of the Left Opposition in Spain, and a growing recognition that the Spanish section was therefore moving away from the International Left Opposition:
i) On relations with Maurin's Catalan Federation and building sympathisers around the Left Opposition
July 1931 - from Spanish Communism and the Catalan Federation:
"The most harmful, dangerous, and even the most ominous development would be to reinforce the idea in the minds of the workers of Catalonia, Spain, and the whole world that we are in solidarity with the Catalan Federation's politics or bear responsibility for them, or even that we are closer to the Federation than to the centrist grouping (the official CP). The Stalinists present it this way with all their might. Up to now, we haven't fought against this vigorously enough. ...
Our supporters in Catalonia ... should declare their position in a clear, open, precise criticism, a criticism that leaves nothing unsaid about Maurin's politics, that mixture of petty-bourgeois prejudices, ignorance, provincial "science," and political crookedness.
In the elections to the Cortes, the Federation received almost 10,000 votes. This is not much. Of course, in a revolutionary epoch, a truly revolutionary organisation is capable of growing fast. There is, however, a circumstance that diminishes greatly the significance of these 10,000 votes: in the Cortes elections, the Catalan Federation obtained fewer votes from Barcelona - the most important revolutionary centre - than it did in the Barcelona municipal elections.
This fact, trifling at first glance, has an enormous symptomatic significance. It demonstrates that while in the most remote corners of the country there is a movement of workers toward the Federation pretty weak - in Barcelona Maurin's confusion does not attract but repels the workers.
What does the Federation represent in the language of revolutionary politics? Is it a communist organisation? And if so, exactly what kind—right, left, or centre? There is no doubt that those who vote for the Federation are revolutionary workers, potential communists. But they are not yet at all clear in their minds. And where can clarity come from if these workers are led by confusionists?
Under these conditions, the most determined, bold, and resolute workers are going to throw themselves inevitably on the side of the official party. The latter obtained only 170 votes in Barcelona and about 1,000 in all of Catalonia. But don't think these are the worse elements. On the contrary, most of these elements could be with us and they will be when we unfurl our banner.
At the start of the 1917 revolution, the majority of the Russian Social Democratic organisations had a mixed character and included in their ranks Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, conciliators, etc. .... I see the Catalan Federation as a similar sort of mixed organisation, indeterminate, which includes future Bolsheviks and future Mensheviks. That justifies a policy of attempting to bring about political differentiation within the ranks of the Federation. The first step on this road is to denounce the political vulgarity of Maurinism. Here we must be merciless.
The analogy between the Catalan Federation and the united organisations in Russia is limited, however, in important respects. The unified organisations did not exclude any existing Social Democratic grouping. Each had the right to struggle for its opinions inside the united organisation. It is completely different within the Catalan Federation. There "Trotskyism" is banned. Each confusionist has the right to defend his confusion there, but the Bolshevik-Leninist cannot openly lift his voice. And so this mixed, eclectic, united organisation excludes the left wing from the outset; but by that very fact, it becomes a chaotic bloc of centrist and right-wing tendencies. ...
But there is another fact that must be considered exceptionally important. The Catalan Federation is officially for the unification of all the communist organisations and groupings. It is certain that the rank-and-file members sincerely and loyally desire this unity although they have all sorts of illusions about this slogan. ...
However, in every way, we support the fight for communist unification. For us, the fundamental condition of this unification is the right to struggle for our slogans and our points of view among the cadres of the unified organisation. We can and we should promise complete loyalty in this fight, but this basic condition of membership has been ruled out from the beginning by the Federation itself.
While fighting under the flag of unity, it bans the Bolshevik-Leninists from its own ranks. Under these conditions, to rely on the Catalan Federation to play the leading role in the fight for the unity of the Communist Party would be the greatest absurdity on our part ... In fighting the Left Opposition, Maurín is imitating the Stalinist bureaucracy in order to win its favour. ...
We must mercilessly denounce Maurin's role, that is, his "unification" charlatanism, without lessening for a single instant our struggle for real unification of the communist ranks, and without weakening our struggle to win the communist ranks to our banner.
Nine-tenths of the work of the International Left Opposition today should be concentrated on Spain. All other expenses must be cut down in favour of the possibility of putting out a Spanish weekly with regular publications in Catalan, and simultaneously issuing pamphlets in considerable quantities. ...
The Spanish revolution is on the agenda. The most important documents must be translated without delay and submitted to the necessary criticism. The next issue of the International Bulletin should be entirely devoted to the Spanish revolution. It is equally necessary to take a series of organisational measures. For that, human and material resources are necessary. Both must be found. There is and there can be no greater crime than to waste time".
September 1931 - from "More on Soviets" and "A Narrow or Broad Faction":
Trotsky is replying to a letter to him from Andres Nin which poses the following question "I have the opportunity to establish communist organisations here in several cities. To what organisation should they adhere? To the Bloc (of Maurin) or to the official party? I have a good deal of hesitation on this point. To make them adhere to the official party is quite difficult, for there is practically no organisation in Catalonia. On the other hand, the political position of the Bloc is at present so false that it is no less difficult to advise their adherence to this organisation. Still I am inclined in favour of this second solution."
Trotsky replied in a first letter that: "From the practical point of view, that is, from the point of view of the relationship of forces at the given moment, it is difficult to solve this problem, but it seems to me that our principled position is really of decisive importance: we declare that we are a faction of the party, a faction of the Comintern. The main struggle against us is carried on along the line that we are "enemies" of the USSR and of the Comintern. Even Maurín lives on the crumbs that fall from this table.
If we call upon the workers to join the Federation, we compromise ourselves throughout the rest of Spain and internationally. Do we gain at all on the Catalan scale? If we consider the present results of our collaboration with the Federation, we find that it is bringing us more harm than benefit. The entire press of the Comintern, and Pravda in particular, has held us responsible for Maurin's opportunist confusionism". ...
It is time to strike a balance. In my opinion, we ought to execute an abrupt political turn to avoid being confused with Maurin any longer- a confusion that has been to his advantage and our own disadvantage.
The most correct procedure would be to call upon the workers to join the Left Communist faction, to build it, and to demand admission into the party. But such a policy requires an official centre, no matter how small, of the Left Opposition in Catalonia."
In a second letter, Trotsky adds the following: "is it still possible to speak seriously of the Left Opposition calling on the workers to enter the Catalan Federation? I cannot understand it! We can, to be sure, try to create our nuclei in the Catalan Federation with the aim of recruiting & maximum of followers in the event of the inevitable collapse of the Maurín organization. We can send individual comrades into the Federation with this aim. But can we openly call upon nonparty workers to enter the Federation? Never. It would be the most monstrous mistake, and would not only weaken but even disgrace the Left Opposition.
Formally, the question of the official party is posed differently, since we have not renounced the idea of winning over the Comintern, and consequently each of its sections. It has always appeared to me that many comrades have underestimated the possibilities for the development of the official Communist Party in Spain. ... To ignore the official party as a fictitious quantity, to turn our backs on it, seems to me to be a great mistake. On the contrary, with regard to the official party, we must stick to the path of uniting the ranks. Nevertheless, this task is not so simple. As long as we remain a weak faction, this task is Inn general unachievable. We can only produce a tendency toward unity inside the official party when we become a serious force.
The opponents of the "broad faction" reply to this: But if we group about us a broad section of workers, we automatically transform ourselves into a second party. I must admit that this argument astonishes me. ... Any political tendency that has confidence in its forces cannot help looking forward to uniting the largest possible masses around it. It is possible to come to the party by different roads. If the Left Opposition becomes stronger than the present official party, that will furnish us the possibility of struggling with a hundredfold greater effectiveness for the unity of the communist ranks than at present when the Opposition is still weak. Isn't this clear? ...
But the partisans of the "narrow faction" will answer, the Left Opposition can only take into it's ranks conscious followers. Indeed! ... But it seems to me that the Opposition has not only the right but also the duty to group about itself all those who come to it, who respond to its appeals and whom it is able to reach. Naturally, at first, they will be far from convinced and conscious Bolshevik-Leninists. But this only imposes the necessity of occupying ourselves seriously with the education of our followers. Within the scope of this education, will also enter the question why we are for one party and why the Stalinists are for two parties.
If the flow towards us proves to be too tempestuous (which is hardly to be feared!), then we can form a circle of sympathisers. A local organisation of the Opposition numbering twenty members can assemble around it two or three hundred sympathisers. In this circle of sympathisers, it will be necessary to clear up the difference between Leninism and centrism.
After the circle has reached a certain level under our direction, it can invite the representatives of the official party to present their views before it. On this basis, a discussion will arise between our followers and the Stalinists. Only this will bring about a serious reconciliation between the Left Opposition and the party and create a far more secure path toward a united party. ...
The Left Opposition would become a sect if it were to come to the conclusion that its task is only criticism of the actions of the official party and of the mass organizations of the proletariat.
It is precisely in Spain that the Opposition can grow within a brief time into a large force. But the first condition for that is not to be afraid of becoming a force but to strive toward that".
ii) On publishing - and then not publishing - a weekly paper
September 1931 - Greetings to 'El Soviet':
Trotsky wrote the following for the first edition of the planned weekly paper:
"You are preparing to publish a weekly This is a serious step forward. Let us hope that others will follow swiftly after this one. ...
For the Bolshevik-Leninist faction, a correct principled corresponding position is not enough; it is necessary to apply it precisely to daily events. Revolutionary strategy requires a tactic.
The importance of the weekly consists in that it brings the Spanish Left Opposition face to face with all the current happenings and forces it to give its immediate fighting reply to them. With the creation of the weekly, the Spanish Opposition rises to a higher stage. ...
The voice of the Bolshevik-Leninists must resound in all parts of the country, at all the mass meetings. Yours are proud tasks. The revolution does not wait".
November 1931 - a letter to Nin:
However, only two months later, Trotsky, showing his exasperation at Nin, was writing the following:
"You write about the "honourable" suspension of El Soviet for refusing to submit to the formal censorship of the governor. I find this manner of posing the question incorrect in principle. A revolutionary organisation cannot suspend publication as a simple political demonstration. This act is worthy of a democrat but not of a Marxist. A Marxist should make use of the legal possibilities to the very end, complementing them with illegal actions. There is nothing "shameful" in submitting to censorship, if you do not have the force to do away with it; it is a question of the relationship of forces, not of abstract morality. To cease publishing a paper without replacing it with an illegal publication simply signifies desertion. In that I see nothing 'honourable'."
December 1931 - from a 'Balance Sheet of the Spanish Section':
Trotsky summed up the situation as follows:
"The extreme weakness of the Spanish Opposition at the beginning of the revolution expressed itself in that, regardless ot the exceptionally favourable situation in the country, our Spanish comrades until recently did not create the opportunity to issue a weekly paper. Help from abroad did not suffice or did not arrive in time.
El Soviet of Barcelona was suspended. It cannot remain unsaid that the reasons the Spanish Opposition gives to explain the suspension of El Soviet are completely unacceptable. Instead of saying clearly and openly: "We have no means, we are weak, send help!" the Spanish comrades declare that they do not want to submit to the censor.
When revolutionists are not in a position to shake off the censor, then they must on the one hand adapt themselves to it legally, and on the other hand say every bit of what is necessary in the illegal press. But they must not disappear from the scene by pointing to the censorship and to their own revolutionary pride, for that means to carry out a decorative but not a Bolshevik policy.
The Spanish revolution has now entered a period of slackening that separates the bourgeois stage from the proletarian. How long this stage will last cannot be foretold. In any event, the Spanish Opposition now has the opportunity to do more systematic and planful preparatory work. Cadres must be developed; there is no time to lose."
iii) On the importance of international discussion
March 1932 - Message to the Conference of the Spanish Left Opposition:
The very fact that the conference ... is being convoked in itself represents an undeniable achievement for which I sincerely congratulate you. ...
First of all, it seems to me that in the regional reports it is necessary to clarify just what part the Bolshevik-Leninists have taken in the genuine acts and struggles of Spain' working class. That is the central question. A political group that stayed outside of the actual movement and occupied itself with criticisms after the events, especially under revolutionary conditions, would be rejected by the working class. ...
I do not doubt that on this fundamental question we shall not have the slightest difference among us. If I nevertheless raise the question it is because the experience of other countries has shown that certain isolated elements are preparing to link themselves with the Left Opposition, elements that under the pretext of "Marxist criticism" actually dodge the revolutionary struggle. For these gentlemen, the revolutionary movement is never sufficiently "conscious," "mature," and "noble," for them to indulge themselves in coming out on the streets with the workers. At an opportune moment, we must purge the organisation of people who, in the crucial moment of the struggle, are inclined to profoundly contemplate their navels. ...
Another question to which I would like to call your attention touches upon the international character of our work. Opportunists like Maurin and his Madrid imitators built up their entire policy on their national peculiarities. Not to know these peculiarities would of course be the greatest idiocy. But underneath them we must know how to discover the motivating forces of international developments and grasp the dependence of national peculiarities upon the world combination of forces.
The tremendous advantage of Marxism and consequently of the Left Opposition consists precisely in this international manner of solving national problems and national peculiarities.
For your young organisation a particular task is carefully following the work of the other sections of the International Left Opposition in order always to do your work in conformity with the interests of the whole. Without international criteria, without regular international links, without control over the work of a national section, the formation of a true revolutionary proletarian organisation is impossible in our epoch".
March 1932 - from a letter to the CC of the Spanish Left Opposition:
"We cannot develop true revolutionists without giving the young communists the chance to follow the day-to-day elaboration of the Bolshevik policies not only in the Spanish section but in the other sections of the International Opposition as well. Only in this manner can we gain experience, build and strengthen the revolutionary consciousness. This is precisely the most important part of the democratic party regime that we strive to establish. ...
But I had to come to the conclusion that our Spanish friends are not yet sufficiently attentive to the life of the International Opposition. Undoubtedly you agree that just as socialism cannot be built in one country, a Marxist policy cannot be pursued in one country alone. ...
It is true that I have myself met some comrades in the ranks of the Left Opposition who speak of the internal ideological struggles in a belittling sense, calling them "quibbles, intrigues." Such comrades have not learned in the school of Marx and Lenin. In order to prepare ourselves for the great struggles, we must learn to be steadfast and uncompromising in all the current principled questions, even when they are of a minor character.
It is most frequently the case that those comrades who call the principled struggles "intrigues" are precisely the ones who display the ability for real intrigues when someone steps on their corns. A lack of concern about principled questions and an exaggerated sensitivity in personal questions characterise many of those who landed by accident in the ranks of the Left Opposition".
iv) On the (concerning) state of the Left Opposition in Spain
December 1932 - from an internal bulletin following Trotsky's informal discussions with other Oppositionists during his visit to Copenhagen:
"One question threw a shadow over the consultation: the situation of the Spanish Opposition. ... It would be criminal to close our eyes any further before the real situation or to palliate it; if we do not succeed in clarifying completely and in time through open discussion all disputed questions - and too many of them have piled up - then the pressure of events may divide us into different camps. ...
Its leaders, influenced neither by the experience of the other sections nor by the public opinion of their own organisation, let themselves be guided by personal connections, sympathies, or antipathies. For a Marxist analysis of the situation and of the differences of opinion, they substituted all too often -we must say it openly - a petty-bourgeois psychologising and sentimentalising. So it was in the case of the Catalan Federation (Maurín), where several Barcelona comrades' confidence in "friendly personal relations" for a long time took the place of principled struggle against petty-bourgeois nationalism and thereby put a brake on the development of the Left Opposition in the most decisive period. ...
The same features revealed themselves in no less sharp and painful a form in the inner life of the Spanish organisation. The crisis that broke out in the leadership caught not only the International Opposition but also the Spanish section by surprise. The members of the Central Committee resigned, one after the other. ... Why? What do the differences of opinion consist of? What are the grounds of the crisis? Nobody knows, at least nobody outside of the narrow circle of the initiated. Such a regime is absolutely impermissible in a revolutionary organisation, and can bring it only defeats.
By refraining from participation in the struggle over principled questions, by substituting personal evaluations for political differences of opinion, the Spanish comrades themselves fall victim to inevitable personal conflicts and "palace revolutions."
Such subjective arbitrariness in politics would be completely impossible if the Central Committee of the Spanish section worked under the control of its own organisation. But this is not the case. In their own defence, several leaders of the Spanish Opposition pointed more than once to the insufficiently high theoretical and political level of the Spanish Oppositionists. Obviously an objection that will not hold water!
The level of a revolutionary organisation rises all the faster, the more it is brought into the discussion of all questions, the less the leaders try to think, act, and behave as guardians for the organisation".
December 1932 - from an international preconference document:
"Taking clear account of the fact that the correction of the mistakes that were made and the creation in Spain of an organisation firm in principle and organised in a revolutionary manner can only be the result of long and systematic work, the preconference proposes the following immediate measures:
a) All important international documents on the questions in dispute must be translated into Spanish and be brought to the knowledge of all the members of the section. ...
b) Both contending groups within the Central Committee must give up the idea of an unprincipled split and of organisational measures, and make the necessary provisions so that the discussion on the disputed questions will run through nor mal channels and have the participation of all members of the organisation without exception.
c) The internal discussion must be carried on in a bulletin whose editorial staff must guarantee the most complete impartiality toward each of the contending groups (through a joint editorial committee).
d) All the principled questions of the International Left must be placed on the agenda, and sympathies, antipathies, and personal insinuations must not be allowed to become substitutes for clear political positions.
e) A comprehensive discussion must prepare the way for a new national conference".
April 1933 - Letter to all members of the Spanish Left Opposition
"The other day I received a copy of the written reply of the Barcelona Central Committee ... for the convocation of a national antifascist conference ... What is the point of ... (such a) conference? ...
In order to camouflage its bankruptcy, the Comintern from time to time organizes a masquerade in imitation of a united front. It brings scattered groups of communist workers together with powerless individuals, pacifists, left democrats, and others, picturing such purely theatrical congresses, conferences, and committees as "a united front of the masses." ...
On this matter the Barcelona Central Committee has taken a position exactly opposite to that of the Bolshevik-Leninists. The letter ... informs the Organisational Commission that the Left Opposition has joined the "united front" as if there were actually a united front involved rather than a mockery of the united front policy.
Helping the Stalinists embellish reality, the letter of the Barcelona CC repeats the general phrases about how a united front against fascism is realisable despite the existence of differences. However, this elementary idea, true in relation to the mass proletarian organisations, loses its meaning in relation to bourgeois individuals, pacifists, democratic writers, and others. ...
The purpose of the united front policy is to bring the Social Democratic and syndicalist workers into a rapprochement with the communist workers (and with communism) through the process of joint struggle against the class enemy. As far as isolated individuals from the bourgeois camp are concerned, that is a matter of tenth-rate significance. The best of them will support the workers more surely, to the extent that the policy of the united proletarian front is pursued correctly, and the masses are drawn together firmly. But abandonment of mass politics for the pursuit of individuals with big names is the worst kind of adventurism and political charlatanism". ...
One is forced to conclude that the Barcelona CC has a position totally contrary to Marxism on this major question in proletarian politics. The struggle of leading Spanish comrades against the fundamental views and principles of the International Left Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists) did not begin yesterday. It can be said without exaggeration that during the past three years there was hardly one serious Spanish or international question on which the leading Spanish comrades held a correct position.
Mistakes, of course, are always possible, and in a young organisation they are inevitable. But it is essential that an organisation, and most of all its leaders, learn from their mistakes. Then it can go forward. The unfortunate thing here is that the comrades who are now on the CC of the Spanish Opposition do not allow the organisation to discuss issues; instead, on every occasion, they substitute personal attacks and petty, insignificant accusations for principled discussion of differences. ...
In any factional struggle personal conflicts and mutual accusations occur: that is inevitable. However, a revolutionary who determines his political position on the basis of purely personal episodes, accusations, sympathies, and antipathies is no good at all. Such a method is typical of petty-bourgeois radicals, incapable of rising to the level of Marxist principles.
Petty-bourgeois squabbles have to date poisoned the leadership of the Spanish Opposition, preventing it from orienting itself correctly and paralyzing the development of the entire organisation, despite the exceptionally favourable objective conditions. If rank-and-file members of the Spanish Opposition, real Bolshevik-Leninists, want to break out of this impasse, they will have to brush aside the debris of personal squabbles and examine political differences on the basis of their merit. ...
With this letter, I am appealing to all members of the Spanish section because my attempts over the past three years to achieve a mutual understanding with the leading Spanish comrades has thus far accomplished nothing".
v) On the leadership of Andres Nin
June 1932 - from a letter to Nin
"Once again you repeat that we have no political differences with you. I would have been very happy if the matter had been really so! ...
If you have a file of my letters to you (and I myself keep the complete file of them), then you would be persuaded without effort that beneath a formal agreement can be uncovered each time an essential disagreement. It is for that reason I think that my aid to the Spanish Opposition would have been greater if, on these contentious questions, we had exchanged our opinions not by private letters remaining without result, as the entire past has convinced me, but by public or semipublic letters, for example in the Spanish bulletin, in order that the Spanish comrades would have been able to take part in the collective elaboration of opinions on all disputed questions".
August 1933 - on "the impermissible conduct of Comrade Nin"
"The recent letters and documents coming from the Central Committee of the Spanish Section, led by Comrade Nin, provoke a feeling that can only be described as indignation ...
As a result of the radically incorrect policy of Comrade Nin, the Spanish section is growing not stronger but weaker. Unfortunately, discussing political questions with (him) leads to nothing: he beats around the bush, engages in diplomacy, equivocates, or what is even worse, replies to comrades' political arguments with personal insinuations ...
With his methods of shabby subterfuge, Nin defends his personal insinuations by quoting my comment - hardly a personal one - that politics is expressed through people. He forgets only that people can produce both good and bad politics, and that each politics selects the people suited to it and trains them accordingly".
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