The Spanish Revolution (1) - from Monarchy to Republic 1930-31

Introduction

The history of both the Russian Revolution of 1917 and Spanish Revolution of 1931-39 provides vital lessons for socialists in how - and how not - to put forward a program and strategy that can successfully lead to a change of society.

In both cases, the Marxist analysis and proposals being made by Leon Trotsky as these revolutions unfolded can be studied as a guide to action today.

Trotsky's "History of the Russian Revolution" sets out a detailed account of the events of 1917, summarised on my separate blog here.

Trotsky's analysis of the Spanish Revolution can be read in the collected writings compiled by Pathfinder Press and/or posted on marxists.org online here. Valuable additional material on Spain is provided by Felix Morrow's "The Civil War in Spain" and "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Spain" as well as Ted Grant and Peter Taaffe's pamphlet, "The Spanish Revolution 1931-37". Further historical details can be found in Pierre Broué's "The Revolution and Civil War in Spain". I have drawn on all of these sources to compile the posts below.

From Monarchy to Republic 1930-31

In this section, excerpts from Trotsky's advice and analysis on:

1) Student struggles

2) The importance of raising democratic demands

3) The National Question

4) The United Front

5) The danger of fascism if there is a lack of revolutionary leadership 

6) Calling for soviets to be created, initially as 'broad strike committees'

7) The demand for a genuinely democratic constituent assembly ('Cortes') - but also for a boycott of elections to an undemocratically constituted Cortes

8) On winning over the army to the revolution

9) On 'Permanent Revolution' and the role of the working-class

10) On transitional demands and slogans

11) On the land question

12) On Anarcho-Syndicalism

13) On the need to build the Party

14) Correspondence with Andres Nin

Context to this period of writings:

As Russia had been in 1917, Spain in the 1930s was the weakest link in the capitalist world. However as Trotsky outlined in January 1931:

"While the Russia of the czars always remained far behind its western neighbours and advanced slowly under their pressure, Spain knew periods of great bloom ... The discovery of America, which at first enriched and elevated Spain, was subsequently directed against it. The great routes of commerce were diverted from the Iberian peninsula... Beginning with the second half of the sixteenth century Spain had already begun to decline ... The condition which Marx called “inglorious and slow, decay” settled down upon feudal-bourgeois Spain".

Broué adds that "In the nineteenth century, Spain lost her remaining world outposts and was in the end barely touched by the industrial and liberal revolution that succeeded in transforming the old Europe. The classes in the old regime continued to disintegrate, without however completing the formation of the emergent bourgeois society. The slowness of capitalist development and the withering of economic relations acted as a brake on the formation of the nation and strengthened centrifugal trends and the separatism of the provinces: businessmen in the Basque provinces and Catalonia, who had benefited from restricted industrial development in the nineteenth century, bore the yoke of Castilian (Spanish) oligarchy with impatience but had no means of shaking it off".

Morrow explains in more detail how, far from leading a 'bourgeois-democratic' revolution to construct a capitalist Spain, the weak capitalist class were entwined with the old feudal monarchy:

"The Spanish and Catalonian industrialists who flourished in those two decades (of belated development between 1900 and the end of the First World War) vied with the most ancient landowning families in their loyalty to the monarchy. Some were ennobled, purchased great tracts of land and combined in their own persons the old and the new economies; others cemented the bonds between the two by mortgages and intermarriages with the landed aristocracy.

Seeking new fields for exploitation, the bourgeoisie secured from (King) Alfonso the conquest of Morocco, begun in 1912. Alfonso's profitable neutrality during the World War endeared him to the bourgeoisie, who for four years found the world market open to their wares.When that market was taken back by the imperialists after the war, and the Catalonian and Spanish proletariat launched great struggles, and when the workers' and peasants' respect for the regime had been dissolved by the disasters to the army in Morocco, the Catalan industrialists financed (General) Primo de Rivera's coup (of September 1923).

The dictator's program of public works and insurmountable tariff walls, suppression of the anarcho-syndicalists and compulsory arbitration boards for the socialist unions, gave industry a new impetus and to Rivera and Alfonso the most fervent adulation of the bourgeoisie. The world crisis put an end to Spanish prosperity and Rivera fell with the peseta in January 1930.

But the bourgeoisie in the main still clung to Alfonso. Indeed, as late as September 28, 1930, and at a mass meeting protesting the (new interim) government's course, Alcala Zamora, who was to head the republic, could still end his speech with a paean of praise to the crown.

Meanwhile, in May 1930, the students and workers of Madrid had hoisted red and republican flags, and engaged the police in rifle fire; in September the socialists and the U.G.T. (socialist trade union federation) made a pact with the republican groups to finish with the monarchy; revolutionary general strikes followed in Seville, Madrid, Bilbao, Barcelona, Valencia, etc., involving fatal encounters with the armed forces in every instance. A rising of the workers to coincide with a republican mutiny in the army was frustrated when the soldiers' revolt of December 12 was precipitated before the time planned; but the executions of the soldier-leaders inspired a manifesto signed by republican and socialist leaders announcing their object to be the immediate introduction of the republic. The signatories were put in the Model Prison of Madrid - and it became the centre of Spanish political life.

(Appointed by Alfonso) Premier Berenguer's desperate attempt to provide a Cortes on the old model as a support for Alfonso was defeated by the republican-socialist declaration of a boycott; Berenguer resigned. The municipal elections (in April 1931) demonstrated that the masses were for a republic.

It was only at this last moment that the industrialists, frightened by the general strikes, by arming of the workers openly going on, and by the socialist threat of a national general strike, decided the monarchy was a cheap sacrifice to the wolves of the revolution. Then, and only then, when Alfonso himself was agreeing that to fight was futile, did the bourgeoisie also agree to the republic".

+++

1) Trotsky on student struggles (after the May 1930 protests)

"When the bourgeoisie consciously and obstinately refuses to resolve the problems that flow from the crisis of bourgeois society, and when the proletariat is not yet ready to assume this task, then it is often the students who come forward ... The petty-bourgeois youth, sensing that an explosive force is building up among the masses, try in their own way to find a way out of the impasse.

By backing up the student movement, the Spanish workers have shown an entirely correct revolutionary instinct. Of course, they must act under their own banner and under the leadership of their own proletarian organisation".

2) Trotsky on the importance of raising democratic demands (May 1930)

"Taking this (revolutionary) road presupposes that the communists will struggle resolutely, audaciously, and energetically for democratic slogans. Not to understand this would be to commit the greatest sectarian mistake.

At the present stage of the revolution, the proletariat distinguishes itself in the field of political slogans from all the 'leftist' petty-bourgeois groupings not by rejecting democracy (as the Anarchists and syndicalists do) but by struggling resolutely and openly for it, at the same time as denouncing the hesitations of the petty bourgeoisie.

By advancing democratic slogans, the proletariat is not in any way suggesting that Spain is heading toward a bourgeois revolution. Only barren pedants full of pat, ready-made formulas could pose the question this way ...

If the revolutionary crisis is transformed into a revolution, it will inevitably pass beyond bourgeois limits, and in the event of victory, the power will have come into the hands of the proletariat. But in this epoch, the proletariat can lead the revolution - that is group the broadest masses of the workers and the oppressed around itself and become their leader - only on the condition that it now unreservedly puts forth all the democratic demands, in conjunction with its own class demands.

First of all, these slogans will be of decisive importance for the peasantry. The peasantry cannot give the proletariat its confidence a priori by accepting the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a verbal pledge. The peasantry, being a large oppressed class, at a certain stage inevitably sees in the democratic slogan the possibility for the oppressed to overthrow the oppressors. The peasantry will inevitably link the slogan of political democracy with the slogan of the radical redistribution of the land. The proletariat will openly support both demands. At the proper time, the communists will explain to the proletarian vanguard the road by which these demands can be achieved, thus sowing the seeds for the future soviet system".

... and re-emphasising these points in his pamphlet "The Revolution in Spain" in January 1931 ... (i.e. why a "one solution, revolution" approach is wrong)

"Only pedants can see contradictions in the combination of democratic slogans with transitional and purely socialist slogans. Such a combined program, reflecting the contradictory construction of historic society, flows inevitably from the diversity of problems inherited from the past. To reduce all the contradictions and all the tasks to one lowest common denominator - the dictatorship of the proletariat - is a necessary, but altogether insufficient, operation. 

Even if one should run ahead and assume that the proletarian vanguard has grasped the idea that only the dictatorship of the proletariat can save Spain from further decay, the preparatory problem would nevertheless remain in full force: to weld around the vanguard the heterogeneous sections of the working class and the still more heterogeneous masses of village toilers. ... This would be the surest way to ruin the revolution. 

Needless to say, democratic slogans under no circumstances have as their object drawing the proletariat closer to the republican bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they create the basis for a victorious struggle against the leftist bourgeoisie, making it possible to disclose its antidemocratic character at every step. 

The more courageously, resolutely, and implacably the proletarian vanguard fights for democratic slogans, the sooner it will win over the masses and undermine the support for the bourgeois republicans and Socialist reformists. The more quickly their best elements join us, the sooner the democratic republic will be identified in the mind of the masses with the workers' republic".

3) The National Question (May 1930)

"Even on national questions, the proletariat defends the democratic slogans to the hilt, declaring that it is ready to support by revolutionary means the right of different national groups to self-determination, even to the point of separation.

But does the proletarian vanguard itself raise the slogan of the secession of Catalonia? If it is the will of the majority, yes; but how can this will be expressed? Obviously, by means of a free plebiscite, or an assembly of Catalan representatives, or by the parties that are clearly supported by the Catalan masses, or even by a Catalan national revolt. 

Again we see, let us note in passing, what reactionary pedantry it would be for the proletariat to renounce democratic slogans. Meanwhile, as long as the national minority has not expressed its will, the proletariat itself will not adopt the slogan of separation, but it pledges openly, in advance, its complete and sincere support to this slogan in the event that it should express the will of Catalonia.

It is useless to say that the Catalan workers do not have the final word to say on this question. If they came to the conclusion that it would be unwise to divide their forces in the present crisis, which opens such sweeping opportunities to the Spanish proletariat, the Catalan workers would have to aim their propaganda toward maintaining Catalonia as a part of Spain, on one or another basis. 

As for me, I believe that political judgement suggests such a solution. Such a solution would be acceptable for the time being even to the most fervent separatists, since it is completely obvious that in the event of the victory of the revolution, it would be ever so much easier than it is today for Catalonia, as well as for other regions, to achieve the right of self-determination".

... and again re-emphasising these points in his pamphlet "The Revolution in Spain" in January 1931:

"While the "separatism" of the Catalan bourgeois is only a pawn in its play with the Madrid government again the Catalan and Spanish people, the separatism of the workers and peasants is only the shell of their social rebellion. One must distinguish very rigidly between these two forms of separatism. 

Precisely, however, in order to draw the line between the nationally oppressed workers and peasants and their bourgeoisie, the proletarian vanguard must take the boldest and most sincere position on the question of national self-determination. The workers will fully and completely defend the right of the Catalans and Basques to organide their state life independently in the event that the majority of these nationalities express themselves for complete separation.

But this does not, of course, mean that the advanced workers will push the Catalans and Basques on the road of secession. On the contrary, the economic unity of the country with extensive autonomy of national districts, would represent great advantages the workers and peasants from the viewpoint of economy and culture"

4) On the 'United Front' (May 1930)

"The communists never relinquish their freedom of political action under any conditions. It must not be forgotten that during a revolution temptations of this sort are very great: the tragic history of the Chinese revolution is irrefutable testimony to this (*when the Chinese communists entered the bourgeois nationalist Kuomintang with disastrous results). 

But while safeguarding the full independence of their organisation and their propaganda, the communists nonetheless practice, in the broadest fashion, the policy of the united front, for which the revolution offers a vast field.

The continuation of the Spanish crisis means the revolutionary awakening of millions among the toiling masses. Nothing indicates that they will suddenly enlist under the banner of communism. Instead, they will probably first reinforce the party of the radical petty bourgeoisie, that is to say, primarily the Socialist Party, especially its left wing, as was the case, for example, with the German Independents during the 1918 1919 revolution. 

That is how the broad and real radicalisation of the masses will be expressed, and not in a growth of "social fascism." (*in this period, this Stalinist theory argued that Social Democracy was also a variety of fascism, refusing to work in a united front with the SPD in Germany, aiding Hitler's rise to power).

Fascism could triumph anew - and this time in a more "social" than "military" form, i.e., like the "social fascism" of Mussolini - only as a consequence of the defeat of the revolution and the disillusionment of the betrayed masses who had believed in it. But in the face of the steady development of recent events, a defeat can take place only as a consequence of extraordinary errors on the part of the communist leadership. 

Verbal radicalism and sectarianism in combination with an opportunist assessment of class forces, a policy of zig-zags, bureaucratic leadership - in a word, everything that goes to make up the essence of Stalinism - are the very things that can reinforce the position of the Social Democracy, the most dangerous enemy of the proletariat, as the experience of the German and Italian revolutionists showed with particular clarity. Social Democracy must be politically discredited in the eyes of the masses. But this cannot be achieved by means of insults. The masses trust only their own collective experience. They must be given the opportunity during the preparatory period of the revolution to compare in action the communist policies with those of the Social Democrats.

The struggle to win over the masses will unquestionably create the conditions for this, if the communists insist in full view of the masses on a united front with the Social Democrats.

Liebknecht (in Germany) had many areas of agreement with the Independents, especially with their left wing. There was an outright bloc between the Bolsheviks and the Left Social Revolutionaries (in Russia). And right up to the (October 1917) insurrection we reached a series of specific agreements with the Menshevik-Internationalists and made

dozens of proposals for a united front. We lost nothing from this policy. 

But, of course, what was involved was not a united front like the Anglo-Russian Committee which meant that at the time of a revolutionary general strike (in 1926) the Stalinists blocked with the strikebreakers. And of course it did not involve a united front in the spirit of the Kuomintang, when, under the false slogan of a union of workers and peasants, a bourgeois dictatorship over the workers and peasants was ensured".

5) The danger of fascism if there is a lack of revolutionary leadership  (Nov. 1930)

"Don't you think that Spain may go through the same cycle as Italy did, beginning with 1918-1919: ferment, strikes, a general strike, the seizure of the factories, the lack of leadership, the decline of the movement, the growth of fascism, and of a counterrevolutionary dictatorship? 

The regime of Primo de Rivera was not a fascist dictatorship because it did not base itself upon the reaction of the petty-bourgeois masses. Don't you think that the conditions for genuine Spanish fascism may be created as a result of the present unquestionable revolutionary upsurge in Spain, if the party of the proletarian vanguard remains passive and inconsistent, as in the past? The most dangerous thing in such a situation is the loss of time".

... and continuing in "The Revolution in Spain" in January 1931:

"Manuilsky ... in Pravda ... calls the dictatorship of Berenguer, like the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, a "fascist regime." Mussolini, Matteoti, Primo de Rivera, MacDonald, Chiang Kai-shek, Berenguer, Dan - all these are variations of fascism. Once there is a ready epithet, why bother to think?

... in spite of the mighty sweep of the struggle, the subjective factors of the revolution - the party, the mass organisations, the slogans - are extraordinarily behind the tasks of the movement, and it is this backwardness that constitutes the main danger today.

The semi-spontaneous spread of strikes, which have brought victims and defeats or have ended with no gains, is an absolutely unavoidable stage of the revolution, the stage of the awakening of the masses, their mobilisation, and their entry into struggle. For it is not the cream of the workers who take part in the movement, but the masses as a whole. Not only do factory workers strike, but also artisans, chauffeurs, and bakers, construction, irrigation, and, finally, agricultural workers. The veterans stretch their limbs, the new recruits learn. Through the medium of these strikes, the class begins to feel itself a class.

However, the spontaneity - which at the present stage constitutes the strength of the movement - may in the future become the source of its weakness. To assume that the movement can continue to be left to itself without a clear program, without its own leadership, would mean to assume a perspective of hopelessness. For the question involved is nothing less than the seizure of power.

Even the stormiest strikes do not solve

this problem - not to speak of the ones that are broken. If the proletariat were not to feel in the process of the struggle during the coming months that its tasks and methods are becoming clearer to itself, that its ranks are becoming consolidated and strengthened, then a decomposition would set in within its own ranks. 

The broad layers aroused by the present movement for the first time would once more fall into passivity. In the vanguard, to the extent to which the ground slipped from under its feet, moods favouring partisan acts and adventurism in general would begin to revive. 

In such an eventuality, neither the peasantry nor the city poor would find authoritative leadership. The awakened hopes would very quickly be converted into disappointment and exasperation. 

... The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera was not fascist but a typical Spanish dictatorship of a military clique supporting itself on certain parts of the wealthy classes; but with the conditions pointed out above - the passivity and the hesitancy of the revolutionary party, and the spontaneity of the mass movement -genuine fascism would find a base in Spain. The big bourgeoisie would conquer the unbalanced, disappointed, and despairing petty-bourgeois masses and would direct their restlessness against the proletariat. Of course, we are far from that point yet. But no time should be lost".

6) Calling for soviets to be created, initially as 'broad strike committees' (December 1930)

"It seems to me that the slogan of soviets is suggested by the whole situation, if by soviets we mean the workers' councils that sprang up in Russia: at first, they were powerful strike committees. Not one of the early participants imagined that the soviets were the future organs of power. ...

Of course, soviets cannot be created artificially. But during each local strike that includes a majority of the trades and takes on a political character, it is necessary to encourage the creation of soviets. This is the only form of organisation, under the circumstances, that is capable of taking the leadership of the movement and of imposing on it the discipline of revolutionary action.

I tell you frankly, I am very much afraid that the historians of the future may have to accuse the Spanish revolutionists of not having known how to take advantage of an exceptional revolutionary situation".

... and again in January 1931:

"As in many other important cases, the Comintern leadership has passed up a revolutionary situation. The Spanish workers have been abandoned to their own fate at a most serious moment. Left almost without leadership, they are developing a struggle of revolutionary strikes with remarkable amplitude.

Under these conditions, the Spanish Bolshevik-Leninists are issuing the slogan of soviets. According to the theory of the Stalinists and the practice of the Canton insurrection (crushed at the cost of thousands of workers' lives in December 1927) it appears that soviets must be created only on the eve of the insurrection. Disastrous theory and disastrous practice! 

The soviets must be created when the real and living movement of the masses manifests the need for such an organisation. The soviets at first are formed as broad strike committees. This is precisely the case in Spain".

7) But also raising the demand for a genuinely democratic constituent assembly ('Cortes') - but to campaign for a boycott of the elections to the undemocratically constituted Cortes being proposed by Berenguer (Jan 1931).

"In the immediate situation, it certainly appears that we could invalidate Berenguer's elections by an energetically applied boycott tactic; in 1905 that was how we invalidated the election of a legislative Duma that was merely consultative. What is the policy of the communists on this point? Do they distribute leaflets, appeals, proclamations on this subject?

But if the Cortes is to be boycotted, then in the name of what? In the name of the soviets? In my opinion, it would be wrong to pose the question that way. The masses of the city and countryside can be united at the present time only under democratic slogans. These include the election of a constituent Cortes on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. I do not think that in the present situation you can avoid this slogan. 

Soviets are as yet nonexistent. The Spanish workers - not to speak of the peasants - do not know what soviets are; at any rate, not from their own experiences. Nevertheless, the struggle around the Cortes in the coming period will constitute the whole political life of the country. To counterpose the slogan of soviets, under these circumstances, to the slogan of the Cortes, would be incorrect. On the other hand, it will obviously be possible to build soviets in the near future only by mobilising the masses on the basis of democratic slogans. 

This means: to prevent the monarchy from convening a false, deceptive, conservative Cortes; to assure the convocation of a democratic constituent Cortes; and so that this Cortes can give the land to the peasants, and do many other things, workers', soldiers', and peasants' soviets must be created to fortify the positions of the toiling masses".

Trotsky returned to these points in his pamphlet "The Revolution in Spain" later in January 1931:

"Can the Spanish revolution be expected to skip the parliamentary stage? Theoretically, this is not excluded. It is conceivable that the revolutionary movement will, in a comparatively short time, attain such strength that it will leave the ruling classes neither the time nor the place for parliamentarianism. Nevertheless, such a perspective is rather improbable. 

The Spanish proletariat, in spite of its combativeness, still recognises no revolutionary party as its own, and has no experience with soviet organisation. And besides this, there is no unity among the sparse communist ranks. There is no clear program of action that everyone accepts. Nevertheless, the question of the Cortes is already on the order of the day. Under these conditions, it must be assumed that the revolution will have to pass through a parliamentary stage.

This does not at all exclude the tactic of a boycott of Berenguer's fictitious Cortes, just as the Russian workers successfully boycotted Bulygin's Duma in 1905 and brought about its collapse. The specific tactical question of the boycott has to be decided on the basis of the relation of forces at a given stage of the revolution.

But even while boycotting Berenguer's Cortes, the advanced workers would have to counterpose to it the slogan of a revolutionary constituent Cortes. We must relentlessly disclose the fraudulence of the slogan of the constituent Cortes in the mouth of the "left" bourgeoisie, which, in reality, wants a conciliationist Cortes by the good graces of the king and Berenguer, for the purpose of haggling with the old ruling and privileged cliques. A genuine constituent assembly can be convoked only by a revolutionary government, as a result of a victorious insurrection of the workers, soldiers, and peasants.

We can and must counterpose the revolutionary Cortes to the conciliationist Cortes; but, to our mind, it would be incorrect at the present stage to give up the slogan of the revolutionary Cortes. To counterpose the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the problems and slogans of revolutionary democracy (for a republic, for an agrarian revolution, for the separation of church and state, the confiscation of church properties, national self-determination, a revolutionary constituent assembly) would be the most sterile and miserable doctrinairism. Before the masses can seize power, they must unite around the leading proletarian party. The struggle for democratic representation in the Cortes, at one or another stage of the revolution, can immeasurably facilitate the solution of this problem".

It's worth also noting these additional excerpts from articles by Trotsky in February 1931:

"The slogan of the revolutionary constituent Cortes must now be advanced, to my mind, with double force. We must not recoil from using distinctly democratic formulations. For example: universal suffrage without discrimination because of sex, from the age of eighteen, with no restrictions. Eighteen years for Spain ... is perhaps even too old. We should stake everything on the youth ... "

and,  "Of course, we make no fetish of this slogan (for a constituent Cortes). Should developments move faster, we will know at the right time to substitute another slogan." 

8) On winning over the army to the revolution (January 1931)

"The contradictions in the army usually correspond to the branch of service. The more advanced the type of arms, that is, the more intelligence required on the part of the soldiers and officers, the more susceptible they are, generally speaking, to revolutionary ideas. While the cavalry is usually inclined to the monarchy, the artillery furnishes a big percentage of the republicans. No wonder the air force, the newest branch, appeared on the side of the revolution and brought with it elements of the individualist adventurism of their profession. The final say remains with the infantry.

... The correct posing of the question of "soldiers' juntas" (Trotsky suggests this word as a term for 'soviets' in the Spanish context) is very important. Because of the very character of military organisation, soldiers' soviets can appear only in the final period of the revolutionary crisis, when the state power loses control over the army. 

In the preparatory period, it will be a matter of organisations of an intimate character, groups of revolutionary soldiers, party nuclei, and, in many cases, personal connections of workers with individual soldiers ...

The revolutionary role of the army, not as an instrument of officers' experiments but as an armed part of the people, will be determined, in the last analysis, by the role of the worker and peasant masses in the course of the struggle. For the revolutionary strike to be victorious, it will have to bring about the confrontation of the workers with the army.  No matter how important the purely military features of such a clash may be, politics outweighs them. The masses of soldiers can be won over only by clearly explaining the social tasks of the revolution. 

But it is precisely the social tasks that frighten the officers. It is natural that the proletarian revolutionists should direct their attention even now to the soldiers, creating nuclei of conscious and daring revolutionists in the regiments. The communist work in the army, politically subordinated to the work among the proletariat and the peasantry, can be developed only on the basis of a clear program. But when the decisive moment arrives, the workers, by the sheer weight of numbers and the force of their assault, must sweep a large part of the army to the side of the people or, at any rate, neutralise it". 

Trotsky also discusses the perspectives for whether or not soldiers' juntas (or soviets) will develop (March 1931):

"A few words on the soldiers' juntas. Would you like to see them arise as independent organisations? This is a very serious question for which a definite line of conduct must be marked out at the very outset, leaving open, of course, the right to introduce corrections if experience indicates the need.

In Russia in 1905, matters did not reach the point of soldiers' soviets. The appearance of soldier deputies in the workers' soviets had an episodic character. In 1917 the soldiers' soviets played a gigantic role. In Petrograd the soldiers' soviet was combined with the workers' soviet from the very beginning. Moreover, the soldiers were the overwhelming majority. In Moscow, the workers' and peasants' soviets existed independently. But this was essentially for organisational reasons: the immense army consisted then of some ten to twelve million peasants.

In Spain we have a peacetime army inconsequential when compared with the population, or even when compared with the proletariat. Is the rise of independent soldiers' soviets in evitable under these conditions? From the standpoint of proletarian policy, we are interested in drawing the soldiers' delegates into the workers' juntas to the extent that the latter are created. Juntas composed only of soldiers could arise only at the culmination of the revolution, or after its victory. Workers' juntas might (and should!) arise earlier, on the basis of strikes, the boycott of the Cortes, or later, on the basis of participation in elections.

We can therefore draw the soldier delegates into the workers' juntas long before soldiers' juntas can be created. But I go further: if we take the initiative in time and create workers' juntas and assure their influence on the army, then perhaps in consequence we will be able to prevent the rise of independent soldiers' juntas in danger of falling under the in fluence of careerist officers rather than of revolutionary workers. The small size and importance of the Spanish army speaks in favour of such a perspective. But, on the other hand, this small army has its independent revolutionary political traditions - more than in any other country. To a certain degree, this may interfere with the soldiers' representation through the workers' juntas.

You see that on this question I have not decided to express myself categorically ... I would rather put the question up for consideration; the sooner the broad circles of advanced workers begin to discuss the key questions, the easier it will be to solve them. At any rate, the course taken should be towards incorporating the soldiers' delegates into the workers' councils. If it should be  only partially successful, even that much would be good".

9) On 'Permanent Revolution' and the role of the working-class - from "The Revolution in Spain" (January 1931):

"In this new revolution, we meet, at first glance, the same elements we found in a series of previous revolutions: the perfidious monarchy; the splinter factions of the conservatives and liberals who despise the king and crawl on their bellies before him; the right-wing republicans, always ready to betray, and the left-wing republicans, always ready for adventure; the conspiratorial officers, of whom some want a republic and others a promotion; the restless students, whose fathers view them with alarm; finally, the striking workers, scattered among the different organisations; and the peasants, reaching out for pitch forks and even for guns.

It would, however, be a grave error to assume that the present crisis is unfolding according to and in the image of all those that preceded it. The last decades, particularly the years of the world war, produced important changes in the economy and social structure of the country. Of course, Spain still remains at the tail end of Europe. But the country has experienced its own industrial development, in both extractive and light industry. During the war, coal mining, textiles, the construction of hydroelectric stations, etc., were greatly advanced. Industrial centres and regions sprang up all over the country. This created a new relationship of forces and opened up new perspectives. ...

Now even less than in the nineteenth century can the Spanish bourgeoisie lay claim to that historic role which the British and French bourgeoisies once played. Appearing too late, dependent on foreign capital, the big industrial bourgeoise of Spain, which has dug like a leech into the body of the people, is incapable of coming forward as the leader of the "nation" against the old estates, even for a brief period. The magnates of Spanish industry face the people hostilely, forming a most reactionary bloc of bankers, industrialists, large landowners, the monarchy, and its generals and officials, all devouring each other in internal antagonisms. It is sufficient to state that the most important supporters of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera were the Catalan manufacturers.

But industrial development raised the proletariat to its feet and strengthened it. Out of a population of twenty-three milion - which would be considerably greater if not for emigration - there are nearly one and a half million industrial, commercial, and transportation workers. To them should be added about an equal number of agricultural workers. 

Social life in Spain was condemned to revolve in a vicious circle so long as there was no class capable of taking the solution of the revolutionary problem into its own hands. The appearance of the Spanish proletariat on the historic arena radically changes the situation and opens up new prospects. 

In order to grasp this properly, it must first be understood that the establishment of the economic dominance of the big bourgeoisie and the growth of the proletariat's political significance definitely prevent the petty bourgeoisie from occupying a leading position in the political life of the country. 

The question of whether the present revolutionary convulsions can produce a genuine revolution, capable of reconstructing the very basis of national life, is consequently reduced to whether the Spanish proletariat is capable of taking the leadership of the national life into its hands. There is no other claimant to this role in the Spanish nation. Moreover, the historic experience of Russia succeeded in showing with sufficient clarity the specific gravity of the proletariat, united by big industry in a country with a backward agriculture and enmeshed in a net of semifeudal relations".

10) Transitional demands and slogans (January 1931)

"A radical program of social legislation, particularly unemployment insurance; shifting the burden of taxation to the wealthy classes; free popular education - all these and similar measures, which in themselves do not exceed the framework of bourgeois society, must be inscribed on the banner of the proletarian party.

Alongside these, however, demands of a transitional character must be advanced even now: nationalisation of the rail roads, which are all privately owned in Spain; nationalisation of mineral resources; nationalisation of the banks; workers' control of industry; and, finally, state regulation of the economy. All these demands are bound up with the transition from a bourgeois to a proletarian regime; they prepare this transition so that, after the nationalisation of the banks and industry, they can become part of a system of measures for a planned economy, preparing the way for the socialist society ...

For the correctly understood theoretical formula to be transformed into a living historic fact, it must penetrate the consciousness of the masses on the basis of their experience and their needs. To do this, it is important to avoid getting bogged down in details, so as not to distract the attention of the masses.

The program of the revolution must be expressed in several clear and simple slogans, which will vary in accordance with the dynamics of the struggle. This is precisely what revolutionary politics consists of."

11) The land question (January 1931)

"The relationships in the Spanish countryside present a picture of semi-feudal exploitation. The poverty of the peasants, particularly in Andalusia and Castille, the oppression by the landowners, authorities, and village chiefs have already more than once driven the agricultural workers and the peasant poor to the road of open mutiny. Does this mean, however, that even during a revolution bourgeois relations can be purged of feudalism? No. It only means that under the current conditions in Spain, capitalism must use feudal means to exploit the peasantry. To aim the weapon of the revolution against the remnants of the Spanish Middle Ages means to aim it against the very roots of bourgeois rule. In order to break the peasantry away from localism and reactionary influences, the proletariat needs a clear revolutionary democratic program. The yearning for land and water, the bondage caused by the high rents, acutely pose the question of confiscation of privately owned land for the benefit of the poor peasants. The burden of state finances, the unbearable government debt, bureaucratic pillage, and the African adventures pose the need for a cheap government, which can be achieved not by the owners of large estates, not by bankers and industrialists, not by the liberal nobility, but only by the toilers themselves.

The domination of the clergy and the wealth of the church put forward the democratic problem: to separate church and state and to disarm the church, transferring its wealth to the people. Even the most superstitious sections of the peasantry will support these decisive measures when they are convinced that the budgetary sums that have up to now gone to the church, as well as the wealth of the church itself, will, as a result of secularisation, go not to the pockets of the freethinking liberals but to the cultivation of the exhausted peasant holdings. ....

The slogan of arming the workers and peasants (the creation of a workers' and peasants' militia) must inevitably acquire an ever greater importance in the struggle. But at the present stage, this slogan too must be closely tied to the questions of defending the workers' and peasants' organisations, the agrarian revolution, the assuring of free elections, and the protection of the people from reactionary military coups".

... In spite of the newest Stalinist theory, it is hardly likely that the peasant juntas (soviets), as elected organs, will appear in any considerable number, prior to the seizure of power by the proletariat. In the preparatory period in the village, different forms of organisation will develop sooner, based not upon elections but upon individual selection: peasant unions, committees of the village poor, communist nuclei, a labour union of agricultural workers, and so forth. The propagation of the slogan of peasant juntas (soviets), based on a revolutionary agrarian program, can even now, however, be put on the agenda".

12) On Anarcho-Syndicalism

Note - from the 'glossary of political organisations' in Grant and Taaffe's 'The Spanish Revolution' :  "the UGT were the second biggest trade union federation, led by the Socialist Party, the CNT were the (largest) anarcho-syndicalist, trade union federation. Led by the FAI which was in effect an anarchist party".

Trotsky writes in January 1931 in "The Revolution in Spain":

"The CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) indisputably embraces the most militant elements of the proletariat. Here the selection has gone on for a number of years. To strengthen this confederation, to transform it into a genuine organisation of the masses, is the obligation of every advanced worker and, above all, of the communists. This can also be assisted by work inside the reformist trade unions, tirelessly exposing the betrayals of their leaders and calling upon the workers to unite in a single trade union confederation. The conditions of revolution will be of extraordinary assistance to this work.

But at the same time we have no illusions about the fate of anarcho-syndicalism as a doctrine and a revolutionary method. Anarcho-syndicalism disarms the proletariat by its lack of a revolutionary program and its failure to understand the role of the party. The anarchists "deny" politics until it seizes them by the throat; then they prepare the ground for the politics of the enemy class ...

If the Socialist Party were to acquire a leading position over the proletariat during the revolution, it would be capable of only one thing: spilling the power conquered by the revolution into the republican sieve, from which the power would then automatically pass to its present possessors. The great conception would result in a miscarriage. 

As far as the anarcho-syndicalists are concerned, they could head the revolution only by abandoning their anarchist prejudices. It is our duty to help them do this. In reality, it may be assumed that a part of the syndicalist leaders will go over to the Socialists or will be cast aside by the revolution; the real revolutionists will be with us. The masses will join the communists, and so will the majority of the Socialist workers.

The advantage of a revolutionary situation lies in the fact that the masses learn fast. The evolution of the masses will inevitably produce differentiations and splits not only among the Socialists but also among the syndicalists. 

Practical agreements with revolutionary syndicalists are inevitable in the course of the revolution. These agreements we will loyally fulfill. But it would be truly fatal to introduce into these agreements elements of duplicity, concealment, and deceit. Even in those days and hours when the communist workers have to fight side by side with the syndicalist workers, there must be no destruction of the principled disagreements, no concealment of differences, nor any weakening of the criticism of the wrong principled position of the ally. Only under this condition will the progressive development of the revolution be secured"...

With the present state of the proletariat, the building of juntas (soviets) presupposes the participation in them of the communists, anarcho-syndicalists, Social Democrats, and the nonparty leaders of the strike struggles. To what extent can we count on the participation of the anarcho-syndicalists and the Social Democrats in the soviets? This cannot be foretold from a distance. The sweep of the movement will undoubtedly compel many syndicalists, and perhaps some of the Socialists, to go further than they wish, provided that the communists are able to present the idea of the workers' juntas with the necessary energy. 

Under the pressure of the masses, the practical questions of the building of soviets, the ratio of representation, the time and method of elections and so forth, can and should become the object of agreement not only of all the communist factions among themselves but also with those syndicalists and Socialists who consent to the creation of juntas. The communists, of course, appear at all stages of the struggle with their banner unfurled".

13) The need to build the Party

Note - at the time of these 1930-31 articles, Trotsky and the Left Opposition were guided by the strategy of reforming the Communist International and its affiliates. In addition, as Morrow notes in "The Civil War in Spain", the Communist Left (the Left Opposition in Spain) "was a tiny handful and not a party. Parties are not built overnight, not even in a revolutionary situation. A group is not a party. The Communist Left, unfortunately, failed to understand this ..."

Trotsky writes in January 1931 in "The Revolution in Spain":

"For a successful solution of all these tasks, three conditions are required: a party; once more a party; again a party! 

How will the relations between the various existing communist organizations and groups be arranged, and what will be their fate in the future? It is difficult to judge from a distance. Experience will show. 

Great events unmistakably put to the test ideas, organisations, and people. Should the leadership of the Comintern appear incapable of offering anything to the Spanish workers except a wrong policy, apparatus commands, and splits, then the genuine Communist Party of Spain will be constituted and tempered outside the official framework of the Communist International. One way or another - a party has to be created. It must be united and centralised.

The working class can under no circumstances build its political organisation on the basis of federations. A Communist Party is needed - not in the image of the future state order of Spain but as a steel lever for the demolition of the existing order. It can be organized only on the principle of democratic centralism.

The proletarian junta (soviet) will become the broad arena in which every party and every group will be put to the test and scrutinised before the eyes of the broad masses. The communists will counterpose the slogan of the united front of the workers to the practice of coalitions of Socialists and a part of the syndicalists with the bourgeoisie. 

Only the united revolutionary front will enable the proletariat to inspire the necessary confidence among the oppressed masses of the village and city. The realisation of the united front is conceivable only under the banner of communism. The junta requires a leading party. Without a firm leadership, it would remain an empty organisational form and would inevitably fall into dependence upon the bourgeoisie".

Trotsky raises criticisms of the pace of party-building and also makes further comments in articles written between February and April 1931:

Feb 1931: "The general revolutionary situation in which the proletarian party must act is now eminently favorable. The whole question now lies with the party itself. Unfortunately, the communists were not the stars in the boycotters' performance (the republican-socialist call for a boycott of Berenguer's undemocratic Cortes elections, which had helped force his resignation in February 1931). 

That is why they did not achieve any important victories in the campaign of the last two or three months. In periods of stormy revolutionary flux, the authority of the party grows rapidly, feverishly - if, in decisive turns, at new stages, the party immediately advances the necessary slogan, whose correctness is soon confirmed by the events. . . . In the course of the last few weeks and months, opportunities have been allowed to escape. But it does no good to look back now. We must look ahead. The revolution is only beginning. We can win back a hundredfold what we have allowed ourselves to lose.

... It is necessary to create immediately a well-organised faction of the Left Opposition, no matter how small it may be to begin with, which will publish its own bulletin and its own theoretical organ. Of course, this does not exclude the participation of the Left Communists in broader organisations; on the contrary, it assumes it". 

March 1931: "It would be a good idea to attempt to make up a political chart of Spain with the aim of determining more precisely the relationship of forces in each region, and the relationship among the regions. Such a chart should also have the workers' districts, the revolutionary centres, the trade union and party organisations, the garrisons, the relationship of forces between the Reds and the Whites, the districts of peasant movements, etc. 

No matter how few in numbers the Oppositionists may be, nevertheless they can take the initiative in various places for such a study, collaborating with the best representatives of other workers' groups. Thus, the elements of the general staff of the revolution would be created. The central nucleus would give this work the necessary unity and cohesion. 

This preparatory, at first seemingly "academic," work will acquire a tremendous, perhaps even a decisive, significance in the future. In an epoch such as the one Spain is now passing through, the greatest of sins is to waste time".

April 1931: "I have finally received the long-awaited news that the Communist Left Opposition has begun publication of its theoretical organ, Comunismo. I don't doubt for a moment that this publication will be well received. 

Spain is going through a revolutionary period. In such a period, the awakened intellect of the proletarian vanguard seeks avidly to understand questions, not in a detached fashion but in all their internal complexities. Revolutionary epochs have always been periods of the development of theoretical curiosity among historically progressive classes.

No theory but Marxism can give answers to the gigantic problems now facing the Spanish communists. We must also point out in an absolutely categorical manner that no group except the Left Opposition is capable at present of giving the Spanish workers an authentic Marxist interpretation of the conditions of the revolution, its motivating forces, its perspectives, and its goals. 

Whereas the official centrist faction of the Communist International subordinates the problems of the proletarian revolution to the interests and needs of bureaucratic prestige, which has been seriously compromised and does not permit critical discussion of any question, the Left Opposition proposes as its goal to say what is. Clarity, theoretical precision, and consequently political honesty is what renders a revolutionary tendency invincible. May Comunismo grow and thrive under this banner!"

14) Correspondence with Andres Nin.

It is in individual letters to Andres Nin, then the key leader of the Left Opposition in Spain, that Trotsky express his concerns about the lack of a clear Left Opposition organisation most forcefully.

Below are some of the key points raised by Trotsky in the correspondence from this period:

December 12, 1930

"I think that even though the Left Opposition may be weak, if it takes the initiative of posing the political (agrarian) and organisational problems of the revolution, it can in a very short space of time occupy the leading position in the movement.

I tell you frankly, I am very much afraid that the historians of the future may have to accuse the Spanish revolutionists of not having known how to take advantage of an exceptional revolutionary situation".

January 31, 1931

"Although the official party as it is today may be feeble and insignificant, nevertheless it possesses all the external historic possibilities in it, in the USSR, and everything that is linked up with the USSR. That is why to guide yourself empirically solely on the immediate relation of forces seems dangerous to me.

The entrance of the Left Communists into larger and broader organisations is justified in Spain more than anywhere else by the condition of the communist ranks on the one hand, by the revolutionary situation on the other. But this tactic creates the immediate danger of the dissolution of the Left Oppositionists into other currents and factions. That is why the creation of a centre of the Left Opposition seems to me the necessary and urgent condition for the entrance of the lefts into other organisations. A paper of the Left Opposition and an internal bulletin, these are necessary".

March 4, 1931

"In my preceding letters, I wrote in detail on the cohesion of the Left Opposition and on its attitude toward the official party. I do not know whether you have received my letters and I am waiting impatiently for you to inform me of your viewpoints on these questions and the practical measures taken by you and your comrades.

Questions of revolutionary strategy and tactics have a meaning only on condition that there exists "the subjective factor" of this strategy, namely, a revolutionary organisation, even if very small in numbers at the start".

March 29, 1931

I receive from Paris letters showing more and more uneasiness on the subject of the situation in Spain. I must tell you that I share this uneasiness. In Spain the situation is revolutionary; in Spain we have entirely qualified representation of the Left Opposition. By correspondence, articles, etc., we have elaborated something like a draft program of the Left Opposition. All eyes are turned toward Spain. And yet the Left Opposition as an official and active organisation does not exist in Spain. And every day lost will have heavy repercussions in the decisive moments. 

Nobody outside of the Left Opposition is capable of giving a correct orientation nor of laying down a proper policy in the revolutionary conditions in Spain. And yet the Left Opposition does not exist ...

The presentation of your candidacy in the municipal elections is obviously a very important point. But you will manifestly agree with me that in politics, above all during the revolution, only those conquests are important which are translated into the growth of the party or, in the immediate case, of the faction. Without that, the tempest of the revolution will completely sweep away the individual initiative, in the event of victory for the revolution as well as in the event of defeat".

April 20, 1931

"In your second letter you show the necessity of influencing the Catalan Federation (led by Joaquín Maurín, the Federation had split from the Spanish Communist Party, although not on a principled Marxist basis) in a friendly manner and tactfully. I am in full agreement with you.

But I cannot fail to emphasise from here, from far off, the second side of the matter. Two or three months ago you estimated that the organisation would be won over by you with no difficulties; together with Maurín you elaborated the theses, etc. A little while later it was asserted that the Federation, because of its equivocal relations with the Comintern, finds your direct entrance into its ranks inopportune. 

This record is, in my eyes, an argument against the attempts to influence the Federation only personally, individually, pedagogically with the lack of an organised left faction acting everywhere with its own banner displayed. Work inside the Federation? Yes, certainly. Work patiently, in a friendly manner, without fear of being checked? Yes, yes, yes. But work openly, as an accredited Left Oppositionist, as a Bolshevik-Leninist belonging to a faction, and as one who demands for it the freedom of criticism and of expounding his opinions".

April 22, 1931

The most important information in your letter is the fact of your entrance into the Central Committee of the Catalan Federation and your editing of the daily publication of the Federation. I cannot state what tremendous significance this fact has. However, the political premises are not clear to me ... On what conditions did you enter the Federation?

... On the Spanish communists and on you personally, dear friend, rests a tremendous historical responsibility. The Catalan Federation is only an arena for influence, but not a sure lever. Without a serious principled basis, with out a clear strategic line, the Catalan Federation, encrusted with numerous prejudices, would not itself stand up under the tests of the revolution and would be defeated at the next sharp turn. A small but firm Marxist nucleus, understanding precisely what it wants, can save not only the Catalan Federation but also the Spanish revolution; but only on one condition: the small nucleus must march under its own clear program and under its own banner".

May 26, 1931

"I am forced to observe that in your letters you prefer to inform me about facts with which I am generally familiar from the newspapers, and at the same time you consistently avoid questions that appear to be of crucial importance ...

As a result of numerous and increasing attempts at achieving minimum clarity through our correspondence I have gotten the impression that you do not seek this same clarity. Why? Evidently this is because you have taken a contradictory position, you are letting things ride while waiting for them to work out by themselves. Experience and theory have shown that such politics have fatal consequences".

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