This post, a further one of mine aimed at summarising the decisions reached by the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920, focuses on two specific Congress resolutions:
A) 'The Communist Party and Parliament' - which discusses the correct approach to take to work in parliament and elections - still very relevant today, and:
B) 'When and under what conditions Soviets of Workers' Deputies should be formed' - which offers a useful comparison to the debate on purely parliamentary tactics.
A) THE COMMUNIST PARTY and PARLIAMENT - 2 August 1920
(Theses drafted by Bukharin with a historical introduction by Trotsky).
1 - The New Epoch and the New Parliamentarianism
The Resolution started with a historical overview of parliamentary tactics which can be summarised as follows:
Marx, Engels and the First International had always taken the attitude that “bourgeois parliaments should be used for agitational purposes”;
However, the parliamentary tactics of socialist parties had become dominated solely by the pursuit of winning partial reforms “within the framework of capitalism” with socialist change itself turned into a “remote ‘final goal’”. “In these circumstances parliamentary careerism and corruption flourished and the vital interests of the working class were secretly, and sometimes openly, betrayed”;
While capitalism was developing the world economy, parliament at least “played a role that was in a certain sense progressive”. However, now (i.e. in 1920 but it applies in 2025 too!), under the conditions of deepening capitalist crisis, reformism is unable to even secure lasting reforms. “Parliament has become a weapon of falsehood, deception and violence, a place of enervating chatter …. parliamentary reforms which are wholly lacking in consistency, durability and order lose all practical significance for the working masses”;
Some genuine socialists, not recognising the depth of the capitalist crisis, continued to believe that meaningful reforms could still be won and therefore still sought to secure gains at all costs, through coalition deals in parliament and the like.
However, “at the present time parliament cannot be used by the Communists as the arena in which to struggle for reforms and improvements in working-class living standards as was the case at certain times during the past epoch”. Instead, “the historical task of the working class is therefore to wrest the parliamentary apparatus from the hands of the ruling classes … replacing it with new organs of proletarian power”;
Nevertheless, it was still helpful to the revolutionary movement to win parliamentary representation when possible, as “reconnaissance units in the parliamentary institutions of the bourgeoisie in order to hasten their destruction”. The resolution specifically criticises the attitude of some parties like the KAPD in Germany and the IWW syndicalists in the US, to “oppose parliamentarianism on principle” as being incorrect.
2 - Communism, the Struggle for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Utilisation of Bourgeois Parliaments
The second section of the resolution develops the concluding point above, explaining the parliamentary tactics that should be employed by Communists:
It begins by making clear that ‘parliamentary democracy’ is a particular form of state power that has been developed by the capitalist class to maintain its power and privileges. Whilst “in reality a weapon of suppression and oppression in the hands of the ruling class, it outwardly appeared to be the organisation of the popular will, standing above classes” - in reality, of course, the real power lay not with the elected parliamentary deputies but with the unelected billionaires and bankers;
It explains that the struggle to win a workers' state will be a time of “acute class struggle”, even civil war, when the working class would need to develop a completely different type of state organisation, one that “excludes representatives of the former ruling classes” - i.e. the Soviet republic. This also applied to local government institutions too, which also needed to be replaced by local Soviets of workers' deputies. [However, see the additional resolution below about the timing of ‘when soviets should be formed'];
In short, the resolution explained that “Communism rejects parliamentarianism as the state form of the future society … it sets itself the task of destroying parliamentarianism. It follows from this that bourgeois state institutions can be used only with the object of destroying them. This is the one and only way the question of their utilisation can be posed”;
It emphasised that the main arena of struggle to change society would not be parliament but mass action organised through trade unions, soviets and the revolutionary party, culminating in an insurrection to overthrow the capitalist state. However, correctly used, as by Liebknecht in Germany and by the Bolsheviks in the Tsarist Duma and Kerensky’s ‘pre-parliament’ for example [see below], parliamentary agitation, and participation in election campaigns, could be a useful additional weapon in support of mass struggle, particularly in winning over those less politically developed layers of the working class who still had illusions in ‘parliamentary democracy’.
The resolution continued with two paragraphs (13 & 14) that I shall quote in full, as their potential relevance today - if not in all their precise specifics but certainly in their general approach - is clear:
“13. Should the Communists receive a majority in the local government institutions, it is their duty to take the following measures:
a) form a revolutionary opposition to fight the bourgeois central authority;
b) aid the poorer sections of the population in every possible way (economic measures, the organisation or attempted organisation of armed workers' militias etc.);
c) expose, at every opportunity, the obstacles which the bourgeois state power places in the way of fundamental social change;
d) launch a determined campaign to spread revolutionary propaganda, even if it leads to conflict with the state power;
e) under certain circumstances, replace the local government bodies with Soviets of workers' deputies.
All Communist activity in the local government institutions must be seen as a part of the struggle to break up the capitalist system”.
"14. The election campaign itself must be conducted not as a drive for the maximum number of parliamentary seats, but as a mobilisation of the masses around slogans of proletarian revolution. The election struggle must involve rank-and-file Party members and not the Party leadership alone; it is essential that all mass actions (strikes, demonstrations, movements among the armed forces etc.) occurring at the time are taken up in the campaign and that close contact is maintained with them. The mass proletarian organisations should also be drawn into active work around the election”.
This section of the resolution ended by taking up the false position taken by ultra-lefts like the KAPD who categorically rejected any participation in elections or parliament, describing this as “a naive and childish position” that, whilst based on an understandable disgust at the behaviour of supposedly socialist parliamentarians, failed “to recognise the possibilities of revolutionary parliamentarianism”. It also noted that “this position is frequently connected with a completely incorrect view of the role of the Party - the Communist Party is seen, not as a militant centralising vanguard of the workers, but as a decentralised system of loosely connected groups”.
But the resolution also noted that “a recognition of parliamentary work does not imply absolute acceptance of the need to participate, whatever the circumstances, in all elections and parliamentary sessions. Participation in a particular election or session depends on a whole series of specific conditions. A certain combination of conditions may make withdrawal from parliament essential”. The same applied to local government elections too. Before any election, the Party needed to weigh up the specific situation being faced at that time.
For example, in a revolutionary situation “when conditions are ripe for an immediate move to armed struggle for power”, it might be correct to boycott elections altogether or perhaps to take part in them but then not take up seats that had been won. It gave as examples how the Bolshevik delegation had walked out of Kerensky's “pre-parliament” in order to undermine it - but because the Soviets were then in a position to counterpose workers' power and commence the October revolution. Similarly, the Bolsheviks had “left the Constituent Assembly on the day of its dissolution, transferring the focal point of political events to the III Congress of Soviets”.
However, the resolution also noted that differences over parliamentary tactics weren't of such primary importance to justify a split in Party ranks - “the questions of proletarian dictatorship and the mass struggle for its realisation are, obviously, immeasurably more important than the question of how to use the parliamentary system”.
3 - Revolutionary Parliamentarianism
The third section of the resolution set out specific guidance to ensure “that the revolutionary parliamentary tactic is used correctly”. Given the obvious ongoing relevance of such guidance for today, I have quoted this below largely in full, while highlighting myself what strikes me as being some of the key points within it:
“1 The Central Committee (CC) and the Communist Party as a whole must … before the parliamentary elections, systematically inspect the quality of the political and organisational abilities of the members of the parliamentary fractions. … The CC ... must have the unquestionable right to object to any candidate put forward by any organisation if it doubts that the candidate, if elected, would conduct himself/herself in a truly Communist manner.
The Communist Parties must break with the old social-democratic custom of putting forward only so-called 'experienced' parliamentarians, mainly lawyers etc. As a rule, they should put forward candidates who are workers. It should not worry them that this sometimes means choosing rank-and-file members who lack any great parliamentary experience.
The Communist Party must be ruthless in relation to those careerist elements who attach themselves to the Communist Party with the aim of getting into parliament. The Central Committees of the Communist Parties must sanction the candidature of people who have proved their loyalty to the working class by their long years of political work”.
“2 The organisation of the parliamentary fraction after the elections are over must be entirely in the hands of the CC, irrespective of whether the Party as a whole is legal or illegal at the time. The CC must confirm the election of the chairperson and the Praesidium of the parliamentary fraction.
The CC must have a permanent representative in the parliamentary fraction with the right of veto. The parliamentary fraction must seek prior directives from the CC on all important political questions. When the Communists in parliament are about to launch an important campaign the CC has the right and duty to appoint or reject the speaker from the fraction, demand from the speaker an outline of the proposed speech or the speech itself for the CC to read and approve etc.
Candidates standing as Communists must give official written undertakings that at the first request of the Central Committee of the Party they will resign their seats, so that, whenever necessary, the Party can organise a united withdrawal from parliament”.
“3 In those countries where reformist, semi-reformist and simply careerist elements have already managed to penetrate the Communist parliamentary fraction (this has already happened in certain countries) the CCs must undertake a thorough purge of the membership of the fraction, proceeding from the principle that the cause of the working class is better served by a small but genuinely Communist fraction than by a large fraction with no consistent Communist line”.
“4 The Communist deputies must combine their legal work with illegal work if the CC so decides. In those countries where the Communist deputy enjoys a certain immunity from bourgeois law, this should be used to assist the Party's illegal organisational and propaganda work”.
“5 Communist deputies must subordinate all their parliamentary work to the extra-parliamentary activity of their Party. The Party and its CC must see that legislative proposals are regularly introduced, not with the idea that they will be accepted by the bourgeois majority, but for the purpose of propaganda, agitation and organisation”.
“6 In the event of street demonstrations and other revolutionary activity initiated by the working class, the Communist deputy must play a leading and visible role at the head of the proletarian masses”.
7 While remaining under the Party's control, the Communist deputies must use every means at their disposal to maintain contact with the revolutionary workers, peasants and other working people through the press and in other ways. Under no circumstances should they behave like social-democratic deputies who strive to build up business connections with their electors. They must at all times be prepared to undertake propaganda work for the Communist organisation.”
“8 Communist members of parliament must bear in mind that they are not ‘legislators' seeking agreement with other legislators, but Party agitators sent into the enemy's camp to carry out Party decisions. The Communist member of parliament is responsible not to the atomised mass of voters, but to the Communist Party, whether legal or illegal”.
“9 The parliamentary speeches the Communist deputies make must be in a language that can be understood by every rank-and-file worker and peasant, every laundress and shepherd - the Party must be able to issue their speeches as leaflets which can be distributed to the most distant rural corners of the country.”
“10 Rank-and-file worker-Communists must not be afraid to speak in the bourgeois parliaments. Even when workers are new to parliamentary work they must not be intimidated by the so-called experienced parliamentarians. If necessary, the worker-deputies can read their speeches straight from notes. The speeches can then be published in newspapers and leaflets”.
“11 Communist members of parliament must use the parliamentary platform to expose, not just the bourgeoisie and its avowed followers, but also the social-patriots, the reformists, the indecisive politicians of the 'centre' and the other opponents of Communism. Likewise, they must use it to spread the ideas of the Third International”.
“12 Even where the Communist Party has only one or two people in parliament, the behaviour of its deputies should be a challenge to capitalism. The deputies should remember that they only deserve the name of Communist if they show ceaseless hostility to the bourgeois system and its social-patriotic lackeys”.
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B) WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS SOVIETS OF WORKERS’ DEPUTIES SHOULD BE FORMED - 5 August 1920.
This additional Congress resolution provides some advice to those sections of the International who - largely prematurely - might have been thinking that the time for ‘revolutionary parliamentarianism’ was past and it was indeed time ‘to wrest the parliamentary apparatus from the hands of the ruling classes … replacing it with new organs of proletarian power’ - in other words, to build soviets.
However, the resolution advised that “all sincere and serious advocates of Soviet power must approach the idea of Soviets cautiously”, stressing the difference between carrying out propaganda in favour of soviets and actually seeking to establish them. In short, as the resolution concluded, “soviets are impossible without a revolution. Without (one), they will inevitably be a caricature of real Soviets”.
The resolution reviewed the history of workers' soviets, first set up during the 1905 Russian Revolution in Petersburg and then, again, during the 1917 Russian Revolution, but this time becoming soviets of both workers' and soldiers’ deputies.
In both cases, the Soviets were formed when the revolution was advancing and there was the potential of soviet power being won. At the end of 1905, once Tsarist counter-revolution had taken hold, the Soviets had been extinguished. At first, in 1917, “the Soviets were able to acquire tremendous authority because they were the strength and power in the country” but began to lose that authority when their Menshevik and Social-Revolutionary leaders failed to take the revolution forward. It was only after the defeat of the attempted Kornilov counter-revolutionary coup in August - and with the Bolsheviks starting to win majorities the key city soviets - that they started to flourish again, preparing the way for the October Revolution itself.
Similar processes had been seen in the revolutionary movements in Germany and Austria, when, as the revolutionary wave swept aside their respective monarchies, soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies had been spontaneously formed. Again, they had the potential of taking power but, again, as the counter-revolution took hold, would decline then disappear.
The resolution added that, in Germany, the treacherous Social Democrats had tried to integrate the Soviets into the bourgeois constitutional system. This was, of course a complete deception and distortion because genuine soviets are built to replace bourgeois state organisations, not to work alongside them.
On the other hand, the resolution assessed that the situation in Austria at that time was more akin to “that in Russia between February and October 1917” because “the working class has formed Soviets which have managed to maintain the unity of the broad masses of the workers”. In this special situation, it resolved that Communists must certainly take part in and build the influence of soviets, and set up Communist fractions within them to encourage their development.
The resolution resolved that the lesson to draw from all of these events was that certain preconditions were necessary before Soviets could be successfully created. These were (as listed in para 5 of the resolution) that:
a) the broadest sections of working men and women, soldiers and working people in general participate in a mass revolutionary upsurge;
b) the economic and political crisis reaches such a height that power begins to slip from the hands of the government;
c) a firm decision is taken by considerable layers of workers and, above all, by members of the Communist Party to begin a systematic, co-ordinated and resolute struggle for power.
It continued that, “in the absence of these circumstances, the Communists must and should consistently and persistently propagandise the idea of Soviets; they should acquaint the masses with the idea, demonstrating to the broadest layers of the population that the Soviets are the only efficient state form in the transition to full Communism. It is not, however, possible to proceed to the direct organisation of Soviets if the above-mentioned circumstances are absent”.
In fact, attempting to build soviets in name only, without the involvement of broad sections of the working masses and when the situation was not yet ripe for a direct struggle for power (as the resolution suggests that “individual Communist groups in France, Italy, America and Britain” were trying to do) would “only harm the real preparation of the Soviet revolution”.
The resolution warned that “artificial 'hot-house' 'Soviets' at best degenerate into small societies preaching the ideals of Soviet power, and at worst into frail Soviets' capable only of compromising these ideals in the eyes of the majority of the people”.
This is why the final summary paragraph of the resolution contains the lines already quoted above, explaining that soviets built outside of a proletarian revolution will inevitably be a “caricature of real Soviets”. Its concluding sentences were that: “Genuine mass Soviets are the historically determined form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. All sincere and serious advocates of Soviet power … must carry out continuous propaganda amongst the masses, but proceed to the direct establishment of Soviets only under the circumstances mentioned above”.
As capitalist crisis deepens, this advice - as with the advice on parliamentary tactics above - retains its validity for the coming struggles of the working class to transform society.
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